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Several empirical studies have found that government expenditures are 
procyclical in developing countries, unlike the countercyclical expenditures 
observed in high-income countries.  This dissertation attempts to explain this 
phenomenon and to refine this empirical observation.  It contains two essays.  The 
first provides a dynamic political economy theory of the phenomenon of 
procyclical fiscal policy.  In the model, governments provide public insurance to 
uninsured households, and time-consistent redistributive policies are 
countercyclical.  The introduction of a political friction, in which alternating 
governments disagree on the desired redistributive policy, can lead to procyclical 
transfer policies.  In numerical simulations, the model successfully captures the 
cyclicality of government expenditures, tax revenues, and deficits observed in the 
data for both high-income and developing countries.  Simulations also allow a 
quantitative comparison with other common explanations for fiscal procyclicality.  
Without the political friction, borrowing constraints and differences in 
macroeconomic volatility cannot account for the differences in fiscal policy 
across countries in this setting. 
The second chapter addresses potential endogeneity problems in the measurement 
of the fiscal stance.  We build a novel quarterly dataset for 49 countries covering 
the period 1960-2006 and subject the data to a battery of econometric tests: 
instrumental variables, simultaneous equations, and time-series methods.   We 
find that (i) fiscal policy is indeed procyclical in developing countries and (ii) 
fiscal policy is also expansionary, lending empirical support to the notion that 
"when it rains, it pours."   
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CHAPTER 1
Rent-Seeking Distortions and Fiscal Procyclicality
Fiscal policies in almost all high-income countries are countercyclical, reected
in countercyclical government expenditures and decits, and procyclical tax rev-
enues.1 Fiscal policies in developing countries are quite di¤erent. Whether in Latin
America (Gavin and Perotti, 1997) or elsewhere in the developing world (Kamin-
sky, Reinhart and Végh, 2004), governments tend to spend and borrow more as
economic conditions improve. That is, developing countries conduct procyclical s-
cal policies. The objective of this chapter is to propose a theory that can account
for the di¤erence between scal policy in high-income and developing countries.
The following chapter will go into more detail on the empirical underpinnings of
these stylized facts.
I begin by rening the observations of the existing literature on the cyclicality
of scal policy. I document that scal policy di¤ers across countries mainly in the
1Throughout this chapter, countercyclicality or scal countercyclicality will refer to the combina-
tion of countercyclical government expenditures, procyclical or acyclical tax rates, and counter-
cyclical decits. Procyclicality or scal procyclicality will refer to a deviation of any one of these
variables from the countercyclical denition. The assertions in the introduction and Section 1.1
are based on data from the International Monetary Funds World Economic Outlook database
from 1970 to 2003.
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cyclicality of government expenditures, not revenues. Specically, there are some
indications that government transfers are the main countercyclical component of
spending in high-income countries.
I propose a model that captures these stylized facts. Because social-insurance
programs make up a large share of government transfers in high-income countries, I
model the cyclical component of government expenditure as redistributive policies
that, inter alia, provide public insurance for uninsured households. This gives
scal policy a countercyclical tendency and I prove that scal policy is indeed
countercyclical in this model in this setting.
I then attempt to explain why scal policy di¤ers in developing countries. A
political distortion is studied, in which alternating governments disagree on the
desired redistributive policy. I nd that as the degree of political polarization
increases, i.e. as the disagreement between successive governments increases, scal
policy becomes more procyclical.
The intuition for these results is as follows. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) used
a political-economy model of alternating governments with divergent preferences
and shows that governments may over-accumulate debt due to this political fric-
tion. If the political environment is su¢ ciently polarized, the governing partys
constituency benets from government spending, but does not fully internalize the
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cost of the (current or future) tax burden needed to nance these transfers, be-
cause it is borne by the entire polity. I take this logic a step further and study
the cyclicality of policies arising from this political structure. In this model, a s-
cal agent with time-consistent preferences would conduct countercyclical policies:
all households prefer countercyclical transfers to procyclical transfers of the same
magnitude, because transfers are valued more in economic downturns. When the
political friction is introduced, however, the incumbent is uncertain as to whether
his successor will value the same constituency that he does. Thus any savings a
government passes on to its successor may be used to benet a di¤erent political
faction. This induces governments to save less and spend more when more tax
revenues are available, making scal policy procyclical. Governments do so even
though their own constituents would prefer to receive transfers during downturns.
Quantitative simulations of the model show that as the political structure
becomes more polarized, government expenditures become more procyclical and
decits less countercyclical, while tax revenues remain highly procyclical. This
captures some cross-sectional features of the data. In the data, government expen-
ditures are countercyclical in high-income countries, but procyclical in developing
countries. Decits are countercyclical in high-income countries, but acyclical in
the average developing country. Tax revenues are procyclical in both high-income
and developing countries.
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Other explanations have been suggested for the phenomenon of scal procycli-
cality in developing countries. The most common is that developing countries face
tight borrowing constraints, which limits borrowing during recessions. I question
the role of borrowing constraints on two counts. First, this model predicts that
borrowing constraints will bind and will a¤ect the cyclicality of government ex-
penditure mainly in business cycle downturns. If borrowing constraints were the
cause for scal procyclicality, we would expect this phenomenon to be particu-
larly pronounced in economic downturns. In fact, the cyclicality of government
expenditure observed in the data appears to be symmetric in peaks and troughs.
Second, simulations of the model show that borrowing constraints have no e¤ect
on the cyclicality of scal policy, when the political friction is not present. This
result holds although borrowing constraints are binding in half of the simulation
periods.
Others have suggested that scal policy may di¤er across income lines because
developing countries face more volatile income shocks or a more volatile tax base.
In contrast, this model predicts that scal policy will be more countercyclical in
more volatile macroeconomic environments, all else equal. This is because the need
for intertemporal insurance is greater where the business cycle is more volatile.
Section 1.1 presents the basic stylized facts on the cyclicality of scal policy in
high-income and developing countries. A review of the literature follows in Section
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1.2. The model is presented in Section 1.3 and is simulated in Section 1.4, which
presents this chapters main results. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.1. Stylized Facts
I begin by documenting the stylized facts on the cyclicality of scal policy in
high-income and developing countries. Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004) have
shown that government expenditures are countercyclical in high-income countries,
but procyclical in developing countries. Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008)
also show that expenditures and decits di¤er greatly in their cyclical properties
across countries. This section renes these stylized facts. Figures 1.1-1.3 present
the main di¤erences in scal policies across countries. The most striking di¤erence
between scal policies in developing and high-income countries is in government
expenditure, as shown in Figure 1.1. The graph plots the correlation between the
cyclical component of real government expenditures and the cyclical component
of real GDP between the years 1970 and 2003, against PPP GDP per capita in
1970. Cyclical components are measured as deviations from trend, using a Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) lter. The negative correlation between the degree of procyclicality
and income per capita is apparent and is statistically signicant at the 99 percent
condence level.
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It is di¢ cult to assess the cyclicality of tax policies, because time-series data on
tax ratesthe relevant policy variableare unavailable for most developing coun-
tries. While there is anecdotal and indirect evidence that tax rates may be counter-
cyclical in a number of developing countries (see for example Kaminsky, Reinhart
and Végh, 2004), this does not translate into a di¤erence in the cyclicality of tax
revenues. As Figure 1.2 shows, the cyclicality of tax revenues is not correlated
with GDP per capita. In fact, the correlation between the cyclical components
of tax revenues and GDP is roughly the same in high income countries (.44) and
developing countries (.43).2
In high-income countries, the combination of countercyclical government ex-
penditures and procyclical tax revenues generates unambiguously procyclical sur-
pluses, with an average correlation of .43 between their cyclical component and
the cyclical component of GDP. Developing countries, whose expenditures and
revenues are both procyclical, show great variance in the cyclicality of their sur-
pluses, as shown in Figure 1.3. Surpluses in developing countries are acyclical on
average.
2Income classications by the World Bank began only in 1989, so it is impossible to determine
which would have qualied as a developing country in 1970 under its classication. In 2007, the
World Bank classied countries with per-capita GDPs of over $11,115 in PPP terms as high-
income. Based on this classication, 20 percent of all countries in the sample are high-income
countries today. In this discussion, the 20 percent of the top countries in terms of income per
capita in 1970 are considered high-income countries. This happens to perfectly coincide with
the countries that are high-income countries in 2007. In interpreting gures I-III, countries with
per-capita PPP GDPs of over $2400 in 1970 are high-income countries.
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The di¤erences in scal policies across income lines appear to be mainly due
to variations in government spending patterns. So far, we have looked at to-
tal government expenditure, which includes government consumption, investment,
transfers, and interest payments. It is interesting to consider the cyclicality of these
components separately. Table 1.1 presents the basic stylized facts. Government
investment and consumption are both procyclical in high-income countries, with
correlation coe¢ cients not much di¤erent than in developing countries.3 Interest
payments are acyclical, on average, in both income groups.4 The main remain-
ing component of total government expenditure is transfer payments. Transfer
payments appear to be the main driver of high-income countriescountercyclical
spending patterns. While data on transfers are unavailable for most developing
countries, the last line of Table 1.1 gives some suggestive evidence. I nd that
social transfers are countercyclical in high-income countries, but procyclical in
Latin America.5 While social transfers may not be representative of other types
3This contrasts with Talvi and Veghs (2005) nding that high-income countries government
consumption is acyclical. In any case, their ndings are consistent with the view that transfers
are the main countercyclical component of government spending in high-income countries. Note
also that the correlations reported here are simple bivariate relationships. A more sophisticated
empirical analysis in the following chapter shows that government consumption may be more
procyclical in developing countries than in high-income countries.
4Data on interest payments is available for only a subset of countries, and for only a subset of
the time period, di¤ering from country to country. The data is also from a di¤erent source, the
International Monetary Funds Government Finance Statistics.
5Social transfers are dened as transfers that fall into the "Social Protection" category according
to the United Nations Classication of the Functions of Government (COFOG). More details
on this classication is available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=4. The
8
of transfer payments, it is nevertheless interesting that unlike the other budgetary
components listed in Table 1.1, the cyclicality of social transfers di¤ers substan-
tially between high-income and Latin American countries.
Focusing on developing countries, Table 1.2 compares the cyclicality of total
government spending during periods in which GDP is above the HP lter trend to
those that are below the trend. The di¤erence between these two correlations is not
statistically signicant, indicating that government spending is no less correlated
with the business cycle in good times than it is in bad times. When excluding
crisis years, dened as those years when the cyclical component of output dropped
by more than two standard deviations, the procyclicality of government expendi-
ture drops by a statistically insignicant margin. In fact, during several recent
output drops of this magnitude (e.g.Turkey in 2001 and Argentina in 2002) gov-
ernment spending was above-trend, reecting these countriesability to conduct
countercyclical policies during some deep recessions. There is no evidence that
the procyclicality of government expenditure is restricted to cyclical downturns, or
particularly driven by these episodes.
dateset was assembled by Michel Strawczynski of the Bank of Israel. The original data sources are
the OECD for OECD countries and the Inter-American Development Bank for Latin American
countries. All high-income OECD countries are included. The Latin American countries included
are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay.
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So far, I have classied countries based on their per-capita income. The theory
that follows predicts that scal policy will be more procyclical in more polarized
political environments as well as in environments with higher political turnover.
Using the index of ethnic fractionalization of Alesina et al (2003), Figure 1.4 shows
that government expenditures are more procyclical in countries with more ethni-
cally fragmented societies. The correlation between the cyclicality of government
expenditures and ethnic fractionalization is .36 and is statistically signicant at
the 99 percent condence level. Similar results hold when using the linguistic frac-
tionalization index, or Easterly and Levines (1997) measure of ethno-linguistic
fragmentation. While there are many other dimensions along which a polity can
be divided (e.g. regional, ideological, religious, or income), it is noteworthy that
the cyclicality of scal policy is correlated with existing measures of political po-
larization.6 Table 1.3 presents this stylized fact di¤erently: countries where scal
policy is procyclical are more fragmented along ethnic lines than those conduct-
ing countercyclical policies. The di¤erence is sizable and statistically signicant
at the 99 percent condence level. Finally, Table 1.4 shows the results of a mul-
tivariate regression, where I regress the cyclicality of government expenditure on
6Fiscal policy does not appear to be related to religious fractionalizationan additional measure
in the Alesina et al (2003) database.
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GDP per capita, the index of ethnic fractionalization, and the International Coun-
try Risk Guides (ICRG) measure of government stability. The latter is intended
to capture the degree of government turnover, which will play an important role
alongside political polarization in predicting procyclical scal policies in the theory
that follows. While the political and social factors do not capture the entire het-
erogeneity in scal procyclicality across countries of di¤erent income levels, ethnic
fractionalization (signicant at the 5 percent condence level) and to a lesser ex-
tent government instability (signicant only at 10 percent condence level) remain
important in explaining procyclical scal policies, after controlling for income per
capita.7
1.2. Literature Review
Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004) provide
evidence of the procyclicality of scal policies in developing countries. Additional
7This regression is merely indicative, and may perhaps understate the role of political polarization
in explaining scal procyclicality. As I mentioned, there are other dimensions along which a polity
may be polarized, for which indices are not readily available. Alesina, Campante and Tabellini
(2008) and an earlier version of this paper (Ilzetzki ,2006) show that corruption is an important
factor in explaining scal procyclicality. Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2008), however, show that
political segregation (a parameter that is closely related to political polarization) is an important
determinant of corruption. Controlling for democracy does not alter these results. Unlike Alesina,
Campante and Tabellini (2008), I nd that democracy is negatively correlated with procyclical
scal policies, although this relation is only signicant at the 90 percent condence level. An
attempt to control for corruption in addition to ethnic fractionalization and government stability
leaves all variables statistically insignicant, presumably due to the multicolinearity between
corruption and the political variables studied here.
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empirical work by Lane (2003) and Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008) shows
that political distortions play a role in explaining scal procyclicality. Studying
OECD countries, the former shows that scal policy is more procyclical in more
fragmented political systems. The latter show that after controlling for a measure
of corruption, scal policys cyclicality is no longer correlated with income per
capita. They also show that nancial market frictions have little explanatory
power for the cyclicality of scal policies.
A number of explanations have been proposed for the phenomenon of scal pro-
cyclicality. Three factors are prominent in discussions on this topic. First, Gavin
and Perotti (1997) suggest that borrowing constraints in developing countries are
the cause for scal procyclicality. When borrowing constraints are binding, gov-
ernments may have no choice but to rely entirely on tax revenues to nance expen-
ditures. This forces governments either to cut expenditures or to increase taxation
in bad times, yielding procyclical scal policies. Aizenman, Gavin, and Hausmann
(2000) formalized this notion in a 2-period model, with endogenous credit risk.
Cuadra, Sanchez and Sapriza (2009) study the role of credit risk in a quantitative
model. Riascos and Végh (2003) and Mendoza and Oviedo (2006) study the role
of incomplete nancial markets in generating procyclical scal policies. Aguiar,
Amador and Gopinath (2006) nd that capital taxation may optimally reinforce
the business cycle when a sovereign cannot fully commit to repay foreign creditors.
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Second, it has been suggested that the procyclicality of scal policy in de-
veloping countries may be an optimal reaction to the di¤erent stochastic environ-
ments confronting developing countries. Talvi and Véghs (2005) political-economy
model, for example, requires an interaction between a political distortion and a
volatile tax base to generate scal procyclicality. In Mendoza and Oviedo (2006),
incomplete nancial markets interact with volatile tax revenues to yield procyclical
expenditure policies.
Third, a number of theories suggest that political distortions may cause scal
procyclicality. The theory in this paper falls into this category. Talvi and Végh
(2005) show that political distortions based on Tornell and Lanes (1999) "voracity
e¤ect" may cause procyclical policies. In their taxation model, governments that
are unable to run scal surpluses due to political factors may diverge from the com-
mon tax-smoothing prescription. In contrast to their model, which focuses on the
cyclicality of tax policy, this model predicts di¤erences in government expenditure
policies, consistent with the stylized facts presented in Section 1.1.
Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008) develop a voting model, in which scal
procyclicality is a side e¤ect of votersattempts to discipline rent-seeking o¢ cials.
In their model, households demand higher transfers at business cycle peaks, know-
ing that the government will extract rents if resources are left idle. The politi-
cal mechanism underlying the Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008) result is
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a de-facto dynamic contract between the polity and rent-seeking politicians. The
political structure in this model is di¤erent. There is no conict of interest be-
tween the government and its constituency. Instead, it is successive governments
that disagree on how to target expenditures. This paper also di¤ers from Alesina,
Campante, and Tabellini (2008) in that I provide a quantitative assessment of my
theory.
Battaglini and Coate (2008a, 2008b) study the cyclical properties of scal policy
in a dynamic version of Baron and Ferejohns (1989) legislative bargaining model.
Azzimonti, Battaglini and Coate (2008) analyze this framework quantitatively. In
their real business cycle (RBC) framework, Battaglini and Coate (2008b) predict
procyclical scal policies. While the political structure I study is di¤erent from
theirs, the underlying political mechanism is similar. In both cases, the political
ine¢ ciency is a dynamic common pool problem. In this paper, successive govern-
ments do not fully internalize the costs of transfers to their constituency, while in
Battaglini and Coate (2008a, 2008b) it is legislative coalitions that do not take in
account the social costs of pork barrel spending. My theory di¤ers from theirs in
two ways. First, Battaglini and Coates (2008a, 2008b) theory is primarily geared
to explaining scal policies in the United States and countries with similar political
structures. Here, I am interested in comparisons of scal policy across countries.
Also, in Battaglini and Coate (2008a, 2008b), households are risk neutral, so that
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their framework gives no reason why scal policies may ever be countercyclical.
In fact, in Battaglini and Coate (2008b), government expenditures are procyclical
even when the political distortion is absent, so that optimal scal policy is pro-
cyclical. In this model, the ruling party faces a trade-o¤ between its constituents
desire for countercyclical policies with its desire to discipline its successors.
This paper provides a new political economy explanation for scal procycli-
cality, but also makes a unique contribution to the literature by presenting a
macroeconomic model that allows for all three proposed explanations for scal
procyclicality and that lends itself to a comparative quantitative analysis of the
three theories.
1.3. The Model
This section describes the model and includes some basic analytical results,
showing that time-consistent scal policy is countercyclical. The following section
shows through numerical simulations that scal policy becomes more procyclical
as the degree of political polarization increases. I begin by describing the models
economic environment and then describe the political structure.
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1.3.1. Economic Environment
Consider a small open economy consisting of a measure-one continuum of house-
holds. Households are indexed by i 2 [0; 1] and are identical in every respect
except for their political characteristics, and thus potentially di¤er only in the
public policies they face. Households value consumption, cit, and dislike supply-
ing hours worked, hit. In each period, they obtain a wage wt (identical across
households) per hour worked. Wages follow a Markov process with support [w
¯
; w̄].
Households choose their labor contribution and consumption in each period.
They do not have access to nancial markets. This is a simple way to motivate gov-
ernment insurance for the private sector. The government uses its ability to borrow
and save in international nancial markets to provide intertemporal insurance for
households.
Modeling scal policy in such a way has several advantages. First, we have
seen that the main source of countercyclicality in the spending behavior of govern-
ments in high-income countries is government transfers, of which social insurance
programs are a large component. Second, scal policy used for this purpose will
tend to be countercyclical. This biases the model against procyclical policies, a
bias that the political distortion introduced here will need to overcome. Finally,
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as documented in Claessens (2006), lack of access to nancial markets is both
prevalent and an important source of vulnerability in developing countries.8
Household labor income is taxed at a uniform, proportional tax rate  t. As
we will discuss in the following subsection, the government cannot discriminate
between households in its tax policy. It can, however, discriminate between house-
holds in its targeted transfers T it  0.
A household i chooses consumption and hours worked in each period to max-












where period utility takes the form proposed by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤-
man (1988):






These preferences are useful for the purposes of the current study. Labor sup-
ply decisions are not dependent on householdswealth, which increases analytical
8Claessens (2006) reports that less than half of the population uses formal nancial institutions
to save in most developing countries. The proportion of the population with savings accounts
is in some cases lower than 10%. Even in the United States, close to 10% of the population
reported not holding any type of transaction account in 2001.
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tractability. This also implies that transfers T it are not distortionary, while taxes
 t a¤ect the labor supply decisions of households in both groups9.
Household i chooses cit and h
i
t in each period to maximize its lifetime utility
subject to its budget constraint:
cit = (1   t)wthit + T it (1.1)
Given that households have no access to credit markets, their optimization problem
is static in each period, yielding the following labor-supply schedule:
ht = h
i
t = [(1   t)wt]
" 8i: (1.2)
The rst equality reects that labor contributions are uniform across household
types.
Substituting (1.1) and (1.2) into householdspreferences, the following indirect
period utility function is obtained:
u
 









9This is important in forcing the government to internalize the distortionary cost of taxation:
su¢ ciently high transfer payments could decrease the labor contributions of transfer recipients
to the extent that they no longer share the burden of distortionary taxes.
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The marginal utility of the transfer payment is equal to the marginal utility of
consumption, which I denote







The marginal (dis-) utility of taxes is
ui =  w"+1t (1   t)
" it: (1.4)
1.3.2. Political Structure
There are two political factions A and B. Each values the welfare of half the pop-
ulation10. The two parties alternate in power, with p denoting the probability that
the incumbent remains in power in the following period. Each faction maximizes a
social welfare function that places an equal weight on the welfare of each member
of its constituency. The constituencies of the two parties may be partially overlap-
ping, with  2 [0; 1] denoting the fraction of each constituency that also belongs
to the constituency of the other party. In other words, the constituency of a given
party is of measure 1
2
, with measure 
2
also included in the constituency of the
10The constituency size is without signicant loss of generality. As I discuss below, an appropriate
calibration of the constituency size would lead to a value of approximately one half. Moreover,
this constituency size is appealing a priori, as it could be interpreted as the size of a minimum
winning coalition in a democratic context. When the political distortion is present, a smaller
constituency size makes scal policy more procyclical, all else equal.
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other party, while measure 1 
2
is uniquely in the constituency of the rst party.
A measure 
2
of the population is unrepresented. There is disagreement between
the two parties as to the desired redistributive policy, with  reecting the degree
of agreement or cohesion between the two political factions. Conversely, we can
think of (1  ) as the degree of political polarization.11 The top panel in Figure
1.5 illustrates the political structure. The bottom two panels of the same gure
present the special cases of  = 0 and  = 1. The interests of each political faction
are fully aligned with their constituencies, so that I also use the labels A and B to
refer to the two constituencies as well.
Similar alternating-government structures have been used in a number of po-
litical economy studies. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) study how political distor-
tions a¤ect steady-state decits. They nd that both the frequency of political
turnover and the degree of political polarization increase the steady state level
of debt. Amador (2003) uses a similar framework to show that political distor-
tions may help sustain agreement between a sovereign debtor and international
11This is similar, but not identical to the denition of polarization in Alesina and Tabellini (1990).






is the weight a party puts on its preferred constituency, with 1  giving the
weight on the oppositions constituency. The closer  is to 1, the more polarized is the polity.
In our setting,  2 [0; 1] is the percentage of the incumbents constituency that is also in the
oppositions constituency. Here, political polarization is decreasing in . Both structures yield
qualitatively similar results. However the notation used here simplies analysis, given that each
faction only transfers to its own constituency when in power.
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creditors. Cuadra and Sapriza (2008) show that this structure can explain the fre-
quency of default and the magnitude of sovereign spreads in politically polarized
and politically volatile environments. Azzimonti (2005) uses this framework to
explain the under-accumulation of capital in developing countries. Her study also
contributes to this literature by showing that this simple alternating-government
framework follows from a model with political microfoundations based on Lind-
beck and Weibulls (1993) probabilistic voting model. She shows that as long as
neither party has a structural electoral advantage, the probability of re-election
p will be constant across time, even if voters take the state of the economy into
consideration in their electoral decisions.
While the terminology used here implies a democratic transition of government,
transitions of power between conicting ethnic, ideological, or interest groups occur
in non-democracies as well, so that the theory presented here need not restrict
discussion to democracies alone.
At the beginning of each period, one of the two factions takes power. With
probability p this is the same faction that governed in the previous period and with
probability (1  p) it is the opposing faction. A governing faction inherits a debt
stock of bt 1 and observes a wage realization wt. The incumbent provides a required
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(constant) level of government consumption g.12 Tax revenues are accumulated
through a tax  it =  t on labor income that is equal across households. The
government can, however, discriminate between households in its choice of transfer
payment T it  0. It is straightforward to show that the optimal transfer policy
involves an equal transfer payment T it = Tt to each household in the governments
constituency, and a transfer of zero to all other households. The government
can borrow and save freely in international capital markets at an exogenous and
constant interest rate r. Debt contracts are fully enforceable; I abstract from
the question of sovereign default in this discussion13. Government consumption is
acyclical by assumption, so that total government expenditure, given by g + T
2
; is
perfectly correlated with transfers in the model.
The incumbent maximizes a social welfare function that puts equal weight on
each constituent household. The welfare function is here normalized by the size of
the constituency. V (bt 1; wt) represents the highest value that the governing party
12Government consumption plays no role in this model and setting g = 0 does not a¤ect any of
the results herein. It is useful to include g for quantitative simulations of the model, where g is
chosen to match the average level of government consumption observed in the data.
13Introducing a time-varying interest rate may in itself a¤ect the cyclicality of scal variables,
depending on the cyclicality of governments borrowing rate. Allowing for an interest rate sched-
ule that is increasing in the governments outstanding debt does not a¤ect any of the papers
results. However, the analysis of Cuadra, Sanchez and Sapriza (2009) implies that a borrowing
rate that is determined by the governments default probability could in and of itself cause scal
policy to become procyclical.
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can achieve when entering period t with the state of nature given by fbt 1; wtg:
V (b; w) = max
;T;b0
u (T; ) +  [pEV (b0; w0) + (1  p)E
 (b0; w0)] (1.5)
subject to
b0 + w"+1 (1  )" = T
2
+ (1 + r) b+ g; (1.6)
T  0; (1.7)
where b  bt 1, b0  bt; and w0  wt+1. Time t subscripts have been suppressed.
 twtht = w
"+1
t  t (1   t)
" are government revenues, using (1.2). 
 (b; w) gives the
value of being out of power.
The government also faces a borrowing constraint. This constraint may be
exogenous and ad hoc, or it may be a natural debt limit as in Aiyagaris (1994).
The natural debt limit constrains the government to hold no more debt than could
be repaid if it faced the lowest possible wage realization in every subsequent period,
while taxing at the peak of the La¤er curve. The revenue-maximizing tax rate is





14This is the solution to the unconstrained revenue maximization problem:
max

w"+1 (1  )"  :
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It is never optimal for the government to choose a tax rate that exceeds this rate,
as there is always a lower tax rate that generates the same amount of revenues at
a lower utility cost to all households. Using this result, the borrowing constraint










where b is an ad-hoc exogenous borrowing constraint and the second term is the
natural debt limit.
The opposition values the welfare of its constituency, with equal weights on the
utility of each member. This leads to the following value of being in opposition:

 (b; w) = u (T  (b; w) ;   (b; w)) + (1  )u (0;   (b; w)) (1.9)
+ [(1  p)EV (b (b; w) ; w0) + pE
 (b (b; w) ; w0)] ;
where T  (b; w),   (b; w) and b (b; w) are respectively the transfer, tax and debt
policies chosen by the incumbent. This equation reects that a measure 
2
of the
oppositions constituency also belongs to the incumbents constituency and thus
faces the same policies T  (b; w) and   (b; w) chosen by the incumbent for its own
constituents. The remaining portion 1 
2
receives no transfer, but is taxed at the
same (non-discriminatory) rate   (b; w).
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A key to understanding the models dynamics is the non-negativity constraint
on transfers (1.7). When the public debt burden is su¢ ciently high, this constraint
is binding, as the government sacrices its redistributive objective in order to re-
duce the debt burden. Given that the government must impose the same tax rate
on its constituents as on the population at large, servicing the debt ultimately re-
quires a tax rate so high that the government prefers reducing the debt burden to
redistributing income in favor of its constituents. I therefore refer to states of na-
ture in which the non-negativity constraint on transfers is binding as a scal crisis.
In all other periods, which I refer to as the redistributive regime, the government
redistributes in favor of its constituency.
The rst order conditions of the governments maximization problem can be
reduced to two equations. (For the moment, consider the case where the borrowing
limit (1.8) is non-binding.) The rst reects intratemporal optimization in the









where  and  are the Lagrange multipliers on the governments budget constraint
and the non-negativity constraint on transfers, respectively. This equation implies
a baseline tax rate T in the redistributive regime (when the transfer payment is
25




The tax rate may exceed its baseline level during a scal crisis (when  > 0).
Note that these last two equations do not contain the political parameters  or p.
Thus intratemporal optimization is not a¤ected by the political distortion in the
static sense. However, an additional condition relates , the Lagrange multiplier
on the governments budget constraint, to the marginal utility of consumption of
households in the incumbents constituency:
 =
1  
1     " 
A; (1.12)
where without loss of generality, faction A is assumed to be the incumbent, so that
A gives the marginal utility of consumption of households in group A; given by
(1.3).
Finally, the rst order condition with respect to b0 gives the following intertem-
poral optimality condition:
 +  [pEVb (b
0; w0) + (1  p)E
b (b0; w0)] = 0; (1.13)
With these equations in mind, I now turn to an analysis of the models dynamics.
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1.3.3. Dynamic Analysis
In analyzing the models dynamics, I start from the benchmark cases p = 1 and
 = 1, in which the political distortion is not present. I then dene an equilibrium
for the model and analyze the models dynamics more generally. Further analysis
of the models dynamics require computational methods, to which I turn in Section
1.4.
1.3.3.1. Time Consistent Policy (p=1). First, consider the case of a time-
consistent policy maker, one that remains in power indenitely. In this case scal
policy will be countercyclical. Proposition 1 proves that the debt burden will be
countercyclical, and the discussion that follows explains why one might expect
transfers to be countercyclical and tax rates to be procyclical.
Without loss of generality, let the current decision makers constituency be
group A. The governments problem becomes a standard time-consistent dynamic
optimization problem. In this case (1.13) becomes a standard Euler equation:
 =  (1 + r)E0; (1.14)
where I have used the envelope condition:
Vb (b; w) =   (1 + r) : (1.15)
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(1.14) gives an Euler equation as in a standard consumption-savings problem.
Writing the equation explicitly using (1.12) gives:
1   t
1   t   " t
"






=  (1 + r)Et
(
1   t+1
1   t+1   " t+1
"






It is easy now to see why the benchmark scal policy is countercyclical. Just as con-
sumers smooth consumption in a consumption-savings problem, the government








In the redistributive regime  t = T and taxes are acyclical. Increases in wt
must be matched with decreases in Tt to smooth t. During a scal crisis, Tt =







. The term (1  t)
1 ("+1)
1  t " t is unambiguously
increasing in  t, so that smoothing of t requires procyclical tax rates in the scal
crisis regime. Finally, Proposition 1, whose proof is provided in Appendix A, states
that government debt is countercyclical. Together, this points to countercyclical
scal policy with a time-consistent policy maker (when p = 1).
Proposition 1 (Time Consistent Fiscal Policy). Assume wt follows an i.i.d
process. When scal policy is time-consistent (p = 1), debt is countercyclical.
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In a previous version of this paper (Ilzetzki, 2008), I proved a more general
statement, that redistributive policies that are Pareto-e¢ cient and time consistent
will tend to be countercyclical, regardless of the governments objective function.
1.3.3.2. Policy Consensus ( = 1). When  = 1; the two factions fully concur
on the identity of transfer receipts. The incumbents maximization problem is still
as dened in (1.5). Here, however, the oppositions value function is:

 (b; w) = u (T  (b; w) ;   (b; w)) (1.17)
+ [(1  p)EV (b (b; w) ; w0) + pE
 (b (b; w) ; w0)] :
Deriving an Euler equation from the rst order condition (1.13) requires di¤eren-
tiating both V (b; w) and 
 (b; w). Given the maximization problem (1.5), one can
apply the envelope theorem once again to obtain (1.15). However, (1.17) is not a
maximization problem, so that the envelope theorem cannot be applied to 
 (b; w).
Di¤erentiating this function is the main challenge in obtaining a general term for
the Euler equation, to which I will turn shortly.
In this case, however, a shortcut is available. Given that the government and
opposition receive identical payo¤s in every period, it is apparent that 
 (b; w) =
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V (b; w) is an equilibrium of the game between successive governments. The prob-
lem is now identical to the case p = 1. Thus Proposition 1 holds in this case as
well and scal policy is countercyclical when  = 1.
1.3.3.3. Borrowing Constraints. So far, I have ignored the borrowing con-
straint in (1.8). Before turning to an analysis of the political distortion, it is
interesting to explore whether the combination of a borrowing constraint and the
absence of a complete market for contingent claims could in themselves cause scal
policy to become procyclical.
The following proposition, whose proof is in Appendix A, states that borrowing
constraints will be binding for low realizations of the wage shock.
Proposition 2 (Borrowing Constraints). Assume that shocks are i.i.d and ei-
ther p = 1 or  = 1. For a given level of inherited debt bt 1, if borrowing constraints
are binding for some wage realizations and slack for other wage realizations, there
exists a cuto¤ wage ~w (bt 1) below which borrowing constraints are binding and
above which borrowing constraints are slack.
Thus, if borrowing constraints are the main cause of scal procyclicality, we
would expect scal procyclicality to be observed mainly during economic down-
turns. The stylized facts of Section 1.1 show that the procyclicality of government
expenditure is not restricted to economic downturns. It is hard to explain the
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procyclicality of scal policy during economic booms with borrowing constraints
alone.
Simulations of the model in Section 1.4 show that in a dynamic context, the
presence of borrowing constraints does not a¤ect the cyclicality of scal policy,
unless the political distortion is also present. Even when borrowing constraints are
frequently binding, procyclical government expenditures are not observed. In this
model, borrowing constraints are at best a partial explanation for the procyclical
scal policies observed in developing countries.
1.3.3.4. Political Distortions. Let us now revisit the general case, where  < 1
and p < 1. As discussed earlier, the main challenge is di¤erentiating the function

 (b0; w0) in (1.13).
The model presented here has multiple equilibria, and an equilibrium rene-
ment is necessary to make further progress in analyzing the dynamics of the model.
First, I restrict attention to symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria. While other, co-
operative equilibrium paths also exist, a non-cooperative game appears the more
appropriate characterization of the interaction between polarized factions in a de-
veloping country.15
15See however, Alesina (1987) and Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinsky (2008) examples of the
interesting dynamics that arise in political economy models with reputational mechanisms.
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Unfortunately, this renement is insu¢ cient. The game studied here may have
multiple Markov Perfect equilibria. In a slightly di¤erent context, Krusell and
Smith (2003) show that the savings-consumption problem of a hyperbolic consumer
may have multiple equilibria, or even a continuum of equilibria. To address this
problem, I follow Krusell, Kuruscu and Smith (2002) in a further equilibrium
renement. I restrict attention to di¤erentiable policy functions. In this context
this implies a di¤erentiable function b0 = f (b; w), giving a governments choice of
debt.16 I can now dene the Di¤erentiable Equilibrium.
Denition (Di¤erentiable Equilibrium) A Di¤erentiable Equilibrium is dened
as two value functions: V (b; w) and 
 (b; w) and three policy functions: T (b; w),
 (b; w) and f (b; w), such that given a stochastic process for fwtg1t=0 :
(1) Given V (b; w) and 
 (b; w); T (b; w),  (b; w) and f (b; w) solve the maximiza-
tion problem in equations (1.5) to (1.8) for the variables T ,  , and b0, respectively.
(2)Given T (b; w),  (b; w) and f (b; w); V (b; w) and W (b; w) satisfy the func-
tional equations (1.5) and (1.9), respectively.
16There is a subtle di¤erence between our problem and that of Krusell, Kuruscu and Smith
(2002). It is unclear whether a policy function f (b; w) that is di¤erentiable over the entire state
space exists. It is apparent, for example, that the policy functions T (b; w) and  (b; w) are non-
di¤erentiable at the transition from the redistributive regime to the scal crisis regime. It is
su¢ cient for our purposes to assume a policy function f (b; w) that is di¤erentiable everywhere
except in the set on fb; wg that results in T = 0 and  = T .
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(3) f (b; w) is di¤erentiable in its rst argument for 8 fb; wg for which T (b; w) = 0
and  (b; w) = T do not both hold.
I now characterize the Di¤erentiable Equilibrium. The analysis proceeds as
follows. Di¤erentiate the value functions V (b; w) and 
 (b; w) with respect to b.
Rather than using the envelope theorem in this di¤erentiation, have each party take
as given the policy function f (b; w) of next periods incumbent when evaluating the
marginal (dis-)utility of debt accumulation. This gives the following Generalized
Euler Equation (GEE), whose derivation is given in Appendix A:
 =  (1 + r)
Z
w0jT 0=0








(1  p)  (1 + r)E [00fb (b0; w0)] 0BB@ 
R








 p fp (1 + r)E [00fb (b0; w0)]  E [0fb (b0; w0)]g ; (1.18c)
where the integrals are over values of w0, for which T 0 = 0 (scal crisis) or T 0 > 0
(redistributive regime). The intuition for this intertemporal condition is as follows.
Recalling that  is the Lagrange multiplier on the governments budget constraint,
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 is the marginal cost of reducing government debt by one unit, as valued by the
incumbent. The benet of this extra unit of savings is given by the right hand side
of (1.18a). This extra unit of savings will be available to next periods incumbent.
In all states of nature for which T 0 = 0 there is no disagreement between the two
parties and the marginal dollar saved will be used optimally from the perspective
of the current government, regardless of who his successor is. On the other hand,
in all states of nature for which T 0 > 0 these savings will have no marginal benet
for households who do not receive transfers. With probability p the incumbent
will be in o¢ ce in the following period. With probability 1   p the incumbent
is out of o¢ ce in the following period, and only a fraction  of the incumbents
constituency (those who also belong to the oppositions constituency) will benet
from the marginal dollar saved. This explains (1.18a).
However, the incumbent and his successor disagree on the optimal choice of
debt two periods ahead: f (b0; w0) : In case the incumbent loses o¢ ce, he would like
to inuence his successors borrowing choice. This e¤ect is captured by (1.18b).
With probability 1 p the incumbent loses power. fb (b0; w0) is the extent to which
a additional dollar saved by the period t incumbent inuences his successor in
period t+1 to save an additional dollar for period t+2. With probability (1  p)2
the incumbent will regain power two periods from now. And to the extent that
an additional dollar of savings today induces the successor to roll over some of the
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savings to the following periodgiving a return to savings of fb (b0; w0)this gives the
period t+2 government a marginal benet of 00. At the same time, these induced
savings come at the expense of transfer recipients (or of the entire population in
a scal crisis) in period t + 1. Thus, the incumbent takes into the account the
cost of inducing his successor to increase savings at time t+1, in terms of transfer
losses to a fraction  of his constituency in the redistributive regime, or his entire
constituency in a scal crisis.
There are also higher order e¤ects. The incumbents attempt to inuence his
successor distorts his own decisions in the following period, if he retains power.
(1.18c) gives the costs of self-induced over-saving if incumbent remains in power,
caused by his attempts to inuence his successors behavior.
1.3.3.5. Procyclical Polices. Why does political polarization cause procyclical
policies? A government in power faces a trade-o¤ between its desire to smooth the
consumption of its constituents and the fear that surpluses left to its successors
would benet a constituency other than their own. When p and  are su¢ ciently
high, the former e¤ect overcomes the latter: the incumbent is either likely to remain
in power in the following period, or likely to be followed by a like-minded successor.
As the values of p and  decline, the latter force becomes more pronounced.
Section 1.3.3.1 described why the smoothing motivation would cause counter-
cyclical scal policy. This section analyzes why the dynamic inconsistency due
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to low values of p or  leads not only to a higher steady-state level of debt, but
also to scal policies that are more procyclical. First, it is useful to characterize
the models invariant distribution. Proposition 3 below states that if an invariant
distribution exists, this distribution contains states in which T > 0, i.e. in the
redistributive regime. This means that there are no scal crisis traps. Second,
note that as p and  decrease, the unconditional probability of being in a scal
crisis increases. This is because the mean level of debt is higher in a more myopic
policy environment.
Finally, I show through numerical simulations that for low values of ; the
economy converges to an invariant distribution that alternates stochastically be-
tween the scal crisis and redistributive regimes. (The numerical simulations are
discussed in greater detail in Section 1.4.) High levels of debt (sequences of low
wage realizations) bring the economy to a state where a scal crisis is more likely.
At this point, further low wage realizations trigger a scal crisis, while high wage
realizations allow the government to redistribute income. This gives procyclical
transfers. But scal policy is procyclical even at lower levels of debt, when a scal
crisis does not occur for any wage realization. This is because the incumbent would
like to redistribute more today and increase the probability that a scal crisis ex-
plodes on its successors watch. There are two reasons for this. First, the lower are
p and ; the more the incumbent discounts future transfers relative to transfers
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today. The incumbent may not be in power in the following period, and disagrees
with his successor. He thus only partially benets from transfers in the future.
Thus, he will transfer more than optimal, and also transfer more the higher is the
wage realization. Second, once in a scal crisis, there is no longer disagreement
between the two political factions. Thus a scal crisis is a means through which
the incumbent can discipline his successor to behave in the current incumbents
interests. Making a scal crisis probable in the following period requires a higher
transfer in periods when income is currently high, giving procyclical transfers.
With low values of  and p; then, the economy reaches an invariant distribu-
tion with both frequent scal crises and periods of redistribution. The following
proposition, whose proof can be found in Appendix A, summarizes this concept.
Proposition 3 (No Fiscal Crisis Traps). Let  (1 + r) = 1 and assume that wt
follows an i.i.d process. For any values of p 2 [0; 1] and  2 [0; 1], if an invariant
distribution exists, it contains states of nature for which the non-negativity con-
straint on transfers is non-binding. In other words, starting in any period t, the
economy will eventually return to the redistributive regime almost surely.
Insofar as the model has an invariant distribution, it includes a positive proba-
bility of being in the redistributive regime. The same cannot be said in general of
the scal crisis regime. In fact, simulations of the model indicate that scal crises
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are very rare events. For su¢ ciently low values of ; the model moves between the
redistributive and scal crisis regimes. But as Figure 1.6 shows, the procyclicality
of government transfers is not driven by scal crises alone. The gure presents an
example of a typical simulation sequence. The top panel gives a 100 year sample
of the random process for wt. Facing this shock process, the lower panel shows
the governments choice of transfers Tt as a percent of GDP when  = 0:8 and
 = 0:4. The model is simulated to match the business cycle features of Argentina
(Section 1.4 provides more detail on the parameterization of the model). The for-
mer value of  is su¢ ciently high to give countercyclical policies, while the latter
gives procyclical policies.
In both cases a scal crisis is a rare occurrence. There are only two such events
(episodes C and F in the gure) in the 100 year sample. These are triggered by
recessions that are long and deep. Once in a scal crisis, scal policy is procyclical
for both values of ; as governments use any new scal room created by positive
wage shocks to resume redistribution.
The two governments di¤er, rather, in their conduct in the redistributive regime.
Governments in the more cohesive polity ( = 0:8) decrease transfers during busi-
ness cycle booms (episodes A, D, and G), giving them room to increase transfers
during the recessions that follow (episodes B, E, and H). Governments in the more
polarized polity increase transfers in business cycle booms, forcing them to decease
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transfers in mild recessions. They are forced to do so to avoid a full-blown scal
crisis due to a relatively moderate recession.
The decision rule for transfers T is shown in Figure 1.7, for  = 0:8 in the
upper panel and for  = 0:4 in the lower panel. The decision rule is a function
of the debt stock b and is displayed for the best and worst business cycle shock
realizations w̄ and w
¯
. Again, it is apparent that scal crises occur only in the worst
of times, when the governments debt stock threatens to violate the governments
intertemporal budget constraint. However, note how the decision rule di¤ers in
the redistributive regime in the two cases. For  = 0:8; the government almost
always redistributes more income when wages are low. For  = 0:4, on the other
hand, for high debt stocks, there is greater redistribution in response to high wages,
creating procyclical policies. These gures give some intuition for the results of
the numerical simulations of the following section.
1.4. Numerical Simulation
This section conducts a quantitative analysis of the models dynamics. The
time inconsistency inherent in the political structure of the model poses some
computational challenges. In the previous section, I followed Krusell, Kuruscu
and Smith (2002) in restricting attention to equilibrium paths with di¤erentiable
policy functions. Here too, standard computational methods do not perform well,
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presumably due to the modelsmultiple equilibria. The governments optimiza-
tion problem is not a contraction, and iterations on the value function do not
necessarily converge. On the other hand, the perturbation method suggested by
Krusell, Kuruscu and Smith (2002) cannot be applied in this context, because the
non-negativity constraint on transfers creates kinks in the policy functions. The
computational algorithm, described in Appendix B, therefore uses nite-horizon
backward induction. I solve a nite-horizon variant of the model with t = 10; 000
periods (years). Increasing the time horizon up to one million periods did not
a¤ect simulation results. There is no guarantee that this nite-horizon analysis
is identical to the Di¤erentiable Equilibrium that was analyzed in Section 1.3.3.4.
However, Krusell, Kuruscu and Smith (2002) show that in their context the Dif-
ferentiable Equilibrium is the limit of a nite horizon problem. We can therefore
expect that the numerical solution presented in this section would yield an accurate
approximation of Di¤erentiable Equilibrium at the innite horizon limit.
1.4.1. Parametrization
It is easy to show that the introduction of a constant-returns-to-scale rm using
labor as its only input would give wages that are perfectly correlated with an
exogenous productivity shock. I assume that the productivity shock follows a
lognormal process, so that wt = ezt, where zt is a random variable, following an
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AR(1) process:
zt   z =  (zt 1   z) + t: (1.19)
Here z is the trend level of productivity, which is normalized to 0;  is the auto-
correlation coe¢ cient; and t is an i.i.d shock normally distributed with mean 0
and variance 2.
The model is simulated in three environments. First, parameter values are
chosen to match the business cycle features of the United States. Second, the
model is simulated with the business cycle features of the United States and with
an ad hoc borrowing constraint. An extreme borrowing limit is imposed: the
government may only save, and may not hold any amount of external debt, so that
b = 0. This is in contrast to all other simulations, where b is set to the natural
debt limit, as in (1.8). Third, I parametrize the model to match the business cycle
features of Argentina, as an example of an emerging market economy.
Parameter values are summarized in Table 1.5. For the U.S., I choose the values
of f; 2g typically used in the RBC literature, in order to isolate the e¤ects of
political phenomena. Given that the model is simulated at annual frequency, this
yields  = 0:81 and  = 0:0144. As is common in the RBC literature for developing
countries, and as suggested by Mendoza (1995), I parametrize the model with
Argentinas business cycle features using terms of trade as the exogenous shock.
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Using the International Monetary Funds (IMF) World Economic Outlook (WEO)
data for the period 1970-2003, Argentinas shock process can be thus be represented
as  = 0:56 and  = 0:079. These values are also very similar to estimates obtained
when looking at the actual output process of Argentina, as in Arellano (2008), for
example. This implies a business cycle that is signicantly more volatile than in
the U.S. I nd that the other di¤erences between the values of economic parameters
of the U.S. and Argentina do not have signicant e¤ects on the cyclicality of scal
policy in the model, so that the main role of the "Argentina" simulations is to
assess the role of di¤erences in business cycle volatility.
I set risk aversion to  = 2, as is common in the literature. The elasticity of
labor supply is set to " = 1:7. This is the value used in Greenwood, Hercowitz and
Hu¤man (1988).
For the benchmark simulation, I set the real interest rate to r = 2:4%, the
average ex-post real return on 10-year Treasury bonds from 1970 to 2003 (nominal
returns and ination taken from the International Monetary Funds International
Financial Statistics). Determining an exogenous average borrowing rate for Ar-
gentina is trickier. Spreads on Argentine sovereign bonds have ranged from 300 to
6000 basis points in recent years. When rates are as prohibitive as at the higher
end of this range, it is hard to separate the borrowing rate from a de-facto con-
straint on external borrowing. Moreover, borrowing rates are likely endogenous to
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the governments policy choices. Empirical evidence on sovereign spreads in Latin
America show that 400 basis points is a typical spread (see for example Table 3
in Eichengreen and Mody, 1998). Based on this evidence I set r = 6:4%. I have
simulated the model for a wide range of interest rates; none of the results pre-
sented here are particularly sensitive to the specic borrowing rate chosen, or to
the introduction of a debt-elastic interest rate schedule.
While the political friction introduces a degree of myopia, the benchmark sim-
ulations without the political friction would be non-stationary if  = 1 + r: I
therefore choose  to match the debt-to-GDP ratios of the United States and Ar-
gentina in the benchmark model. This gives  = :976 for the U.S. and  = :934
for Argentina. I set the ratio of government consumption to GDP at its average
level between 1970 and 2003. Based on WEO data, this average ratio is 11 percent
for the United States and 4.5 percent for Argentina.
Turning to political parameters, I leave political cohesion  as a free parameter.
However, for ease of presentation, I choose benchmark values for p and look at the
e¤ects of changes in  for a given level of p. We will later revisit the interaction
between the two political parameters. The values of p are chosen to match the
turnover rate in the two countries. In the United States, the observed likelihood
that the incumbent party retains the presidency in an election year was 0:64 in
the 20th century. Adjusting this to reect the annual frequency of the model gives
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p = 0:9. In Argentina, government turnover is more irregular, and Argentina was
a non-democracy for parts of the 20th century. Also, the volatile party structure in
Argentina makes it di¢ cult at times to determine whether a given party represents
the same economic interests as its successors. A casual reading of Argentine presi-
dential history indicates that the probability that a given political faction remains
in power in a given year is approximately 0:8, whether the government is replaced
through elections or force. As we will see, the simulations qualitative results are
not sensitive to the specic choice of p.
1.4.2. Results
Figures 1.8-1.10 present the main simulation results. The solid curves represent
the correlation between a given scal variable and GDP in three sets of simula-
tions, each across a range of values of  (political cohesion). The correlations are
computed using the deviations of the simulated time series from their HP trend.
Simulations are of 1000 periods, with the rst 900 discarded to minimize the e¤ects
of initial conditions.
The curvesintersection with the y axis are results of the benchmark specica-
tion, in which  = 1, so that there is full agreement between political parties and
no political distortion is present. To facilitate comparison with the data, the actual
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correlation between (the cyclical components of) GDP and government expendi-
ture in the U.S. and Argentina are shown in dotted lines. Figure 1.8 gives results
for the correlation between government expenditures and GDP. Figure 1.9 shows
the correlations between tax revenues and GDP. Figure 1.10 shows the correlations
between the decit and GDP.
When parametrized with the business cycle features of the United States, the
model predicts highly countercyclical government expenditures and decits when
no political distortion is present. The model requires only a small degree of polit-
ical polarization (0:95 for expenditures and 0:8 for decits) to match the features
of scal cyclicality in U.S. data. Moving along the x axis, as political polarization
increases, government spending becomes less countercyclical, and eventually pro-
cyclical. Decits become less countercyclical, and eventually acyclical, as political
polarization increases. The model can thus explain the fact that government ex-
penditures and decits are countercyclical in countries that are more politically
cohesive, but procyclical and acyclical, respectively, in more polarized political
environments.
Consistent with the data, the model shows highly procyclical revenues with
little di¤erences across countries. At the same time, the correlation of government
revenues with GDP in the model is almost always very close to 1. This is a feature
of many models with linear income taxes, because the tax base is highly procyclical.
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In this model, simulated tax rates do become more countercyclical as  decreases,
but this does not have a sizeable e¤ect on the cyclicality of revenues.
When the model is parametrized with the business cycle features of Argentina,
the results are qualitatively similar. Without the political distortion, government
expenditures are strongly countercyclical, as in the U.S. simulation. In fact, except
for extremely polarized political environments ( < 0:3) the model predicts poli-
cies that are more countercyclical in the volatile Argentine environment. This is
because the need for intertemporal insurance for households increases with higher
business-cycle volatility. The model matches the observed correlation between gov-
ernment expenditure and GDP in the Argentine data for  = 0:6. The model has
greater di¢ culty in matching the observed cyclicality of decits in Argentina. The
conclusion emerging from this set of simulations is that one would expect more
countercyclical scal policies in more volatile business cycle environments, all else
equal.
Next, I tighten the borrowing constraints, so that governments have no access
to borrowing. They can, however, save freely at the exogenous interest rate r. Fig-
ures 1.8-1.10 show that borrowing constraints have no e¤ect on the cyclicality of
scal policy unless the political friction is also present. In the benchmark simula-
tions ( = 1) government expenditures and decits remain highly countercyclical,
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even though borrowing constraints are binding in half of the simulated periods. In-
terestingly, borrowing constraints do appear to reinforce procyclical expenditures
and decits when the political friction is present. This indicates that political and
nancial market frictions might reinforce each other, but I do not nd support
for the idea that borrowing constraints alone play an important role in explaining
scal procyclicality.
Figure 1.11 shows the interaction between the two political parameters. It
shows simulation results for the Argentina parametrization for a range of values for
p (the probability of the incumbent remaining in power in the following period),
with  (political cohesion) changing along the x axis. According to the World
Banks Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al, 2001), few countries have
had annual turnover rates higher than 30 percent at an annual frequency, implying
a value of p = 0:7. I look at values of p ranging from 0:5 to 0:95, keeping in mind
that the lower end of this range implies unrealistically high turnover relative to
the rates observed in the data. Not surprisingly, higher turnover (lower p) causes
scal policy to become more procyclical.
Figure 1.11 also demonstrates the utility of quantitative analysis in the under-
standing of political economy phenomena. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) predict
that government indebtedness increases in both turnover (1  p) and political po-
larization (1 ). Here, too, both parameters are necessary conditions for distorted
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policies to appear. However, model simulations highlight that while political polar-
ization uniformly a¤ects the cyclicality of government expenditures for any value
of p 2 (0; 1), political turnover has little e¤ect on the cyclicality of scal policy in
cohesive political environments (high levels of ). Even with turnover more fre-
quent than observed in reality, the cyclicality of government expenditures remains
virtually unchanged for values of  > 0:9. Thus a cohesive polity can expect to
benet from e¢ cient scal policies even when turnover is frequent. At the same
time, a dictator ruling over a polarized society might conduct distorted scal poli-
cies, as long as there is some positive probability that an opposing faction will seize
power in the future.
The models predictions arising from simulations can be summarized as fol-
lows. Without the political distortion, scal policy is countercyclical, reected
in procyclical tax revenues, and countercyclical expenditures and decits. This
is true even in volatile macroeconomic environments, and even when borrowing
constraints are frequently binding. The introduction of a political distortion can
match the procyclical policies observed in developing countries, when political po-
larization is su¢ ciently high ( is su¢ ciently low).
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1.5. Conclusions
Imperfections in capital markets are frequently assumed to be the main culprit
for the procyclicality of scal policy in developing countries. The volatile business
cycle environment in developing countries is also often cited. The theory pre-
sented here raises questions regarding the power of these explanations. It provides
an alternative political explanation and demonstrates that polarized political en-
vironments may yield procyclical scal policies. Quantitative simulations of the
model are able to capture a number of the salient di¤erences in the cyclicality of
scal policy across countries.
The theory of this paper also has some interesting implications for the current
economic downturn. The models simulations, as shown, for example, in Figure 1.6,
indicate that governments in highly polarized political environments will conduct
procyclical scal policies both during business cycle peaks and during recessions.
But the simulations also indicate that relatively cohesive polities may conduct
procyclical policies in deep protracted recessions. As the current recession unfolds,
it will be interesting to see which governments will demonstrate a capacity and
willingness to conduct countercyclical measures.
CHAPTER 2
Procyclical Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries: Truth
or Fiction?
Over the last 10 years, a large and growing literature has argued that there is a
fundamental di¤erence between how scal policy is conducted in developing coun-
tries compared to industrial countries. While scal policy in industrial countries is
either acyclical or countercyclical, scal policy in developing countries is, by and
large, procyclical. Gavin and Perotti (1997) were the rst to call attention to the
fact that scal policy in Latin America is procyclical. Talvi and Végh (2005) then
claimed that procyclical scal policy seems to be the rule in all of the develop-
ing world. In fact, in Talvi and Véghs (2005) study, the correlation between the
cyclical component of government consumption and GDP is positive for each of
the 36 developing countries in their sample (with an average of 0.53). In sharp
contrast, the average correlation for G7 countries is zero. By now, a large number
of authors have reached similar conclusions, to the point that the procyclicality of
scal policy in developing countries has become part of the conventional wisdom.1
1See, among others, Mailhos and Sosa (2000), Braun (2001), Sanchez de Cima (2003), Lane
(2003), Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004), Alesina and Tabellini (2005), Manasse (2006),
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Perhaps the more convincing evidence that this idea has indeed become con-
ventional wisdom is the explosion of theoretical models trying to explain such a
puzzle. In other words, why would developing countries pursue a procyclical scal
policy that might exacerbate the business cycle? An all too brief review of the
literature reveals that explanations follow two main strands: (a) imperfections in
international credit markets that prevent developing countries from borrowing in
bad times (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Riascos and Végh, 2003; Guerson, 2003; Ca-
ballero and Krishnamurthy, 2004; Mendoza and Oviedo, 2006; and Susuki, 2006)
and (b) political economy explanations, typically based on the idea that good times
encourage scal proigacy or rent-seeking activities (Tornell and Lane, 1998, 1999;
Talvi and Végh, 2005; Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini, 2008; and the theory of
the previous chapter).
But do we really know what we think we know? Is it really the case that
government spending responds positively in a causal sense to the business cycle in
developing countries? While a positive correlation between the cyclical component
of government consumption and GDP certainly gives no indication of causality, the
literature has implicitly assumed that the causality goes from the business cycle
Sturzenegger and Wernek (2006), Strawczynski and Zeira (2007), and Section 1.1. of this
dissertation.
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to scal policy. But is this a reasonable inference? No, according to the insight-
ful comments of Roberto Rigobon on Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004). In
fact, Rigobon has argued that the structure of shocks in developing and industrial
countries is such that it is more likely that reverse causality explains the observed
patterns in the data (i.e., scal policy is driving output). In a similar vein, the
numerous papers that have purported to establish that scal policy is procyclical
by regressing some measure of scal policy on some measure of the business cycle
while controlling for other factors have essentially ignored the problem of endo-
geneity.2 Could accounting for endogeneity make the procyclical results disappear?
This is precisely the argument made by Jaimovich and Panizza (2007), who claim
that, once GDP has been suitably instrumented for, causality runs in the opposite
direction (i.e., from scal policy to GDP). But, surprisingly enough, there is little
systematic work in this area. This would seem to be a major shortcoming, given
that if scal policy in developing countries is not really procyclical, all the existing
theory would be essentially irrelevant.3
2We note exceptions like Braun (2001), Lane (2003), Galí and Perotti (2003), and Strawczynski
and Zeira (2007).
3Notice that, theoretically, scal policy is expansionary in both Keynesian and neoclassical mod-
els. In the standard neoclassical model (see, for instance, Baxter and King (1993)), an increase
in government purchases is expansionary because the negative wealth e¤ect reduces consump-
tion and leisure, thus increasing labor and, by increasing the marginal productivity of capital,
investment.
52
In addition to the obvious academic interest of this question, its relevance
for public policy is hard to understate. In fact, the ability to transition from a
procyclical scal policy to an acyclical or countercyclical policy is viewed as a badge
of macroeconomic honor in the developing world and as a sign that the country
belongs to an exclusive club that relies on sound scal and monetary policies.4 If
procyclical scal policy simply reects reverse causality, then this way of thinking
is unfounded.
The main purpose of this paper is then to ask whether scal policy is really pro-
cyclical in developing countries, or does causality run the other way and previous
researchers have just misidentied a standard expansionary e¤ect of scal policy.
To tackle this question in depth, we turn to quarterly data. Previous empirical
literature in this area has used annual data. While annual data may be su¢ cient to
explore the basic correlations and for some empirical approaches, we will see that
the identication assumptions underlying our VAR regressions are valid for quar-
terly, but not annual, data. To this e¤ect, we assemble a database with quarterly
data that encompasses 49 countries (27 developing and 22 industrial) and which,
depending on the country in question, goes as far back as 1960. After developing
some simple econometric models, we subject our data to an array of econometric
4See Arellano (2006) for the case of Chile and Strawczynski and Zeira (2007) for the case of
Israel.
53
tests aimed at disentangling causality. While a particular methodology may not be
fully convincing in and of itself, we attempt to reach our conclusions by a prepon-
derance of evidence. We thus resort to instrumental variables, GMM, simultaneous
equations, and time series techniques (Granger causality and impulse responses).5
In addition to focusing on the issue of causality, our methodology allows us to
identify empirically a critical channel underlying this literature, which has been
entirely disregarded so far. Implicit in the current literature is the idea that pro-
cyclical scal policy is sub-optimal because it exacerbates the business cycle what
Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004) have dubbed the when it rains, it pours
phenomenon. If changes in scal policy did not a¤ect output, then at least from
a purely macroeconomic point of view procyclical scal policy should not be a
cause for concern. As part of our econometric tests, we will be able to test whether
changes in government spending a¤ect output. In other words, we will be able to
ascertain whether the when-it-rains-it-pours idea is empirically relevant.
After discussing some conceptual and methodological issues in Section 2.1, Sec-
tion 2.2 develops empirical models that illustrate some of the main ideas at stake
and formalize the equations that will be estimated in the following sections. Sec-
tion 2.3 discusses our data sets and variables of interest. Section 2.4 sets the
5As a reference point and for the purposes of comparing with the existing literature we also
carry out many of the estimations using an annual dataset.
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empirical stage by replicating (with quarterly data) existing results that are ob-
tained by regressing changes in (the log of) real government consumption on (the
log of) real GDP. Section 2.5 turns to instrumental variables as a way of dealing
with the endogeneity problem. We follow Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) in using
the weighted GDP growth of countriestrading partners as an instrument for GDP
(and also add additional instruments). Unlike Jaimovich and Panizza, however, we
nd that government consumption is indeed procyclical in developing countries in
contrast to the acyclical government consumption observed in high-income coun-
tries. These results are consistent with the ndings of the existing literature, and
are strengthened when we use GMM to estimate the same system. Section 2.6
estimates a simultaneous equations system by OLS. Here we nd evidence of both
the procyclicality of scal policy in developing countries and of an expansionary
e¤ect of scal policy. Section 2.7 develops our VAR estimations. We start with
Granger causality tests that reject the hypothesis that the business cycle does not
Granger-cause government consumption. We then show impulse responses which,
again, are broadly consistent with the idea that an output shock leads to higher
government spending.
After this exhaustive battery of econometric tests, we can summarize our results
as follows:
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 There is ample econometric evidence to indicate that procyclical scal
policy in developing countries (dened as a positive response of govern-
ment spending to an exogenous expansionary business cycle shock) is truth
and not ction. IV, GMM, (OLS) simultaneous equations estimations,
Granger-causality tests, and impulse responses all o¤er strong support for
this proposition.
 The econometric evidence on the cyclicality of government consumption
in high-income countries is mixed, and depends on the specication. Our
IV and GMM estimations suggest that government consumption is acycli-
cal in high-income countries, while our OLS and VAR estimates indicate
that government consumption actually procyclical, contrary to the cur-
rent conventional wisdom. While the focus of our paper is on scal policy
in developing countries, our results on high-income countries suggest that
further research may be warranted on the cyclicality of government con-
sumption in the industrialized world.
 In contrast, the econometric evidence on total government spending in
high-income countries is more robust. While a simple IV regression is
inconclusive, the GMM, OLS and VAR specications show that total gov-
ernment spending is countercyclical in high-income countries, and that it
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contrasts sharply with the cyclicality of government spending in develop-
ing countries. This provides further support the observation in Chapter 1,
that the main di¤erence between scal policy in high-income and develop-
ing countries is in government transfers, which are the main expenditure
category making up the di¤erence between government spending and con-
sumption.
 We also nd evidence of an expansionary e¤ect of scal policy on output in
both developing and high income countries. The implied scal multipliers
peak at 0.63 for developing countries and 0.91 for high-income countries.6
At least for developing countries, then, this provides clear evidence that
the when-it-rains-it pours phenomenon is empirically relevant (i.e. pro-
cyclical scal policy amplies the underlying business cycle) and should
indeed be a serious public policy concern.
2.1. Conceptual and methodological issues
This section discusses some important methodological issues that arise in this
area.
6The gure for high income countries is roughly consistent with the estimates of 0.90 and 1.29
(depending on the methodology) for the United States reported by Blanchard and Perotti (2002,
Table 4) and somewhat higher than the estimate of 0.52 for a panel consisting of Australia,
Canada, United Kingdom, and United States reported in Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2007).
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2.1.1. How do we measure scal policy?
Conceptually and in line with Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004) we think
that it only makes sense to measure scal policy by looking at policy instruments.
After all, if one is interested in macroeconomic policy, one should focus on in-
struments rather than outcomes (which lie outside the policymakerscontrol). In
theory, at least, the two key scal policy instruments are government consumption
(as opposed to government spending, which would include transfers which consist
largely of automatic stabilizers, and debt service, which are the governments con-
tractual obligations) and tax rates (as opposed to tax revenues, which respond
endogenously to the business cycle). While many studies in the literature look at
the scal decit (see, for example, Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini, 2008), we
feel that this not an appropriate measure of scal policy precisely because of the
cyclicality of tax revenues. In other words, even if scal policy were completely
acyclical (i.e., even if the path of government consumption and tax rates were in-
dependent of the business cycle), the scal balance would be in surplus in good
times (as the tax base expands) and in decit in bad times (as the tax base con-
tracts). An econometrician looking at the scal balance may thus conclude that
scal policy is countercyclical (i.e., the government is trying to actively smooth the
business cycle) when in reality the government is engaged in a completely neutral
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scal policy and smoothing both government consumption and tax rates, in the
spirit of Barros (1979) neoclassical prescriptions.
Focusing on the scal balance might also lead to erroneous conclusions when
comparing the cyclicality of scal policy across countries. For instance, several
papers conclude that scal policy is more procyclical in developing countries than
in industrial counties because the correlation of the scal balance with the business
cycle is positive in industrial countries and less so or negative  in developing
countries (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Alesina, Campante and Tabellini, 2008). This
inference is not warranted, however, because it might be the case that government
consumption and tax rates behave similarly but tax revenues are more procyclical
in industrial than in developing countries.
Since, unfortunately, there is no readily available cross-country data on tax
rates, we will restrict our attention to the spending side. While, for the above
reasons, our main focus will be on government consumption, we will also look at
overall government spending for several reasons. First, since much of the existing
literature has focused on government spending, it provides a useful reference point.
Second and as discussed below looking at government spending allows us to
infer something about the cyclical behavior of transfers, which provides insights
into how much governments insure the private sector against the business cycle.
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In terms of measuring government consumption, notice that if we had a perfect
price deator for government consumption, cyclical changes in relative prices would
not a¤ect real government consumption. In practice, of course, we do not have
such rened price indices and it is thus likely that changes in relative prices do
a¤ect measured government consumption. For instance, in developing countries
the relative price of non-tradable goods is typically procyclical. Since the public
wage bill is a major component of government consumption, deating nominal
government consumption by the CPI index will most likely imply that measured
government consumption increases in good times and falls in bad times.
For the purposes of this paper government consumption is deated using a
deator specic to government consumption, whenever available (mainly high-
income countries and large developing countries; see Appendix C for more details).
Elsewhere, we have no choice but to use the CPI index. For countries where several
indices are available, all of our results are robust to using either the government
consumption deator, the GDP deator, or the CPI index.
2.1.2. Breaking down government spending
For the purposes of our discussion, it proves useful to break down government
spending as follows:
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government spending = government consumption + public investment
+ transfers + debt service.
With this simple scal accounting as background, a couple of points are worth
mentioning.7
First, notice that this breakdown does not necessarily coincide with the one
used by, for example, Galí and Perotti (2003) in their study of scal policy in the
European Union. Their main breakdown is between cyclical (or non-discretionary
or automatic) and cyclically-adjusted (or discretionary) government spending. They
focus on the discretionary component on the grounds that this is the better measure
of the scal stance. In our view, however, the distinction between discretionary
and non-discretionary spending is not relevant for our purposes. What matters is
the actual response of government consumption to the cycle, rather than whether
this response comes about as part of some explicit discretionary scal policy rule
or some legal constraint that requires the government to increase spending in some
states of nature (e.g., to provide more school lunches in bad times).
7It is important to keep in mind that, in country and international organizationspublications,
government spending is often labeled di¤erently. In IFS, for instance, it is referred to as gov-
ernment expenditure. (The reader is referred to Appendix C for details.)
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Second, while not our main focus, whenever data are available we will check the
cyclicality of public investment and debt service and use that information to infer
the cyclicality of transfers. Our conjecture is that transfers will be countercyclical
(as is the case, for instance, for unemployment insurance or food stamp programs),
particularly in industrial countries or relatively well-o¤developing countries with a
social safety net in place. In other words, even when scal policy is not actively used
to smooth the business cycle, it is possible that the government is trying to insure
the private sector from business cycle uctuations. Since we nd that, on average,
debt service is acyclical and public investment is procyclical the acyclicality or
countercyclicality of government spending must reect the countercyclical nature
of transfers.
2.1.3. Is it really the case that when it rains, it pours?
As is apparent from the existing literature, scal procyclicality in developing coun-
tries constitutes a puzzle in search of an explanation because both the Keynesian
and the neoclassical theoretical perspectives suggest that it cannot be optimal to
reinforce the business cycle by expanding scal policy in good times and contract-
ing it in bad times (i.e., what Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh, 2004, have dubbed
the when it rains, it poursphenomenon).
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In a Keynesian world, due to sticky prices or wages, the economy does not
adjust immediately to its full-employment level of output in response to output
shocks. In such a model, an increase in government consumption would increase
aggregate demand and lead to higher output. The optimal scal policy is thus
countercyclical. In this world, reducing government consumption in a recession
(the pourcomponent) would reduce output even further. For empirical purposes,
we will capture this Keynesian world in Models 1, 2, and 3 of next section.
In a neoclassical world, an optimal scal policy would imply constant tax rates
over the business cycle in the spirit of Barro (1979). In terms of government
consumption, the optimal policy would depend on the specication of the model.
Clearly, if government consumption entered preferences separably, then a smooth
path would be optimal. On the other hand, if government consumption were a sub-
stitute (complement) for private consumption, then it would optimally be coun-
tercyclical (procyclical). While, theoretically, one can indeed think of scenarios
in which government consumption could be a substitute (think of government-
provided school lunches) or complement (think of government-provided port ser-
vices) to private consumption, we believe that in practice the substitutable compo-
nent will be mainly reected in transfers (food stamps, unemployment insurance)
and the complementarity in public investment (providing better roads in good
times), neither of which are part of government consumption. Hence, at a rst
63
approximation, we will think of optimal government consumption in a neoclassical
world as being uncorrelated with the business cycle. In this light, procyclical gov-
ernment consumption would also be sub-optimal. A recurrent explanation in the
literature for this sub-optimal response is the presence of some political distortion,
which leads to higher government consumption as a second-best response. We will
capture this world in Model 4 below.
According to standard neoclassical theory, an increase in government consump-
tion would also be expansionary. Consider, for example, the model of Baxter and
King (1993). An increase in government spending leads to a short (and long) run
increase in output because the resulting negative wealth e¤ect induces households
to consume less goods and less leisure (i.e. labor supply goes up). The increase in
labor supply increases the marginal productivity of capital thus leading as well to
an increase in investment.
Our econometric evidence for an expansionary e¤ect of government consump-
tion could thus be capturing either a Keynesian or neoclassical model. In either
case, however, the nding of procyclical government spending is evidence of a sub-
optimal response. In a Keynesian world, this output e¤ect would reinforce the
shock hitting the economy and in a neoclassical world it would represent an unde-
sirable source of output uctuations. Both our simultaneous equations and VAR
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regressions below will enable us to measure the expansionary impact of government
consumption.
2.2. Empirical models
This section lays out some simple empirical models that will provide a useful
guide to our empirical estimations.
2.2.1. Model 1: A contemporaneous scal rule
The simplest model to think about issues of reserve causality is the following:
gt = yt + "t; (2.1)
yt = gt + t; (2.2)
where gt and yt are (the cyclical components of) government spending (or con-
sumption) and output;  ( R 0) and  (  0) are parameters; and "t and t
are i.i.d shocks with mean 0 and variance 2" and 
2
, respectively, with Et"t = 0.
Equation (2.1) captures a scal reaction function whereby government spending
responds to contemporaneous output, with the coe¢ cient  representing the cycli-
cal stance of scal policy: if  < 0, scal policy is countercyclical; if  = 0, scal
policy is acyclical; and if  > 0, scal policy is procyclical. Equation (2.2) allows
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for an expansionary e¤ect of government consumption on output. The shocks "t
and t capture scal and output shocks, respectively. We assume that jj < 1.8
We can interpret most of the current literature as having estimated some version
of equation (2.1). With some notable exceptions (Braun, 2001; Lane, 2003; and
Jaimovich and Panizza, 2007), problems related to the endogeneity of yt have been
cast aside. As Rigobons (2004) insightful comments show, ignoring the problem
of endogeneity can lead to a highly misleading picture. To see this, solve for the
reduced form of system (2.1) and (2.2) to obtain:
yt =
"t + t
1   ; (2.3)
gt =
t + "t
1   : (2.4)












8As can be checked, this condition ensures that the ratio 2g=
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Hence, even if scal policy were countercyclical ( < 0), the correlation between yt
and gt would be positive (as typically reported in the literature), but the claim that
this captures procyclical scal policy would clearly be false. In general, equation
(2.5) implies that the sign of the covariance between yt and gt depends on whether
scal or output shocks dominate. If scal shocks dominate, the covariance will be
positive; if output shocks dominate (and  < 0), the covariance will be negative.
For normative purposes, suppose that we think of this model as capturing a
Keynesian world, where yt denotes deviations of output from the full-employment
level. What does the model tell us about the desirability of countercyclical scal







Take  as given. Since, by assumption, jj < 1, the range of  is given by
 2 ( 1=; 1=). Given that V ar(yt) is a strictly increasing function of  in the
range ( 1=; 1=), a policymaker whose objective is to minimize the variance of
output will set a negative value of  such that  !  1. In that case, the variance
67







An acyclical policy ( = 0) would imply that V ar(yt) = 2 and any procyclical
scal policy would imply that V ar(yt) > 2. This simple model thus rationalizes
the idea that procyclical scal policy in developing countries is a puzzle to the
extent that a countercyclical policy would be more e¤ective in stabilizing output.
Notice, incidentally, that countercyclical scal policy is optimal only if gov-
ernment spending impacts output (i.e.,  > 0, which implies that the when-it-
rains-it-pours channel is present). If  = 0, then scal policy is irrelevant and the
procyclicality discussion would be devoid of macroeconomic policy implications.
Naturally, from an econometric point of view, equation (2.1) cannot be esti-
mated by OLS because the covariance between yt and "t is not zero. Indeed, by





" > 0. (2.7)
We will therefore proceed in the following way. In Section 2.5, we will estimate
equation (2.1) by instrumental variables. As instruments for output, we will use
the weighted growth of countriestrading partners and lagged GDP growth. In
Section 2.6, we use these same instruments and, in addition, the real interest
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rate on U.S. treasury bills to estimate equations (2.1) and (2.2) as a system of
simultaneous equations using GMM.9
2.2.2. Model 2: A lagged scal rule
Suppose now that (a) government spending responds to lagged rather than con-
temporaneous output and (b) output is determined by lagged output and current
government spending:
gt = yt 1 + "t; (2.8)
yt = yt 1 + gt + t; (2.9)






Substituting (2.8) into (2.9), we obtain
yt = (+ )yt 1 + t; (2.10)
9We exploit that fact that, unlike Jaimovich and Panizza (2007), our system is overidentied,
allowing us to estimate all structural parameters. We also improve on their results by using a
GMM estimator. The 2-stage-least-squares estimator is a special case of the GMM estimator,
but not the most e¢ cient. We estimate the variance-covarience matrix of the system using
the method of Newey and West (1987), which takes into account both heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation. See section 6 for further discussion.
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Suppose that the policymakers objective is to minimize output variability for given





By implementing this optimum, the variance of output is reduced to 2. An acycli-
cal or procyclical policy is clearly suboptimal. Intuitively, suppose that there is a
negative shock to output. If scal policy is neutral (i.e., acyclical), the autoregres-
sive structure implies that output will be persistently low for a while. But if scal
policy is countercyclical, the increase in g will partly o¤set the fall in output.
10As in model 1, notice that if  = 0, then scal policy cannot a¤ect the variability of output
and the issue of optimal scal policy becomes moot.
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From an econometric point of view, notice that equations (2.8) and (2.9) can
be estimated by OLS since
E("tyt 1) = 0;
E (tyt 1) = 0;
E (tgt) = 0:
We will estimate this system for quarterly data in Section 2.6.
2.2.3. Model 3: An expectational scal rule
Now assume yet another  and highly plausible  scal rule, in which current
government spending responds to the expectation of yt conditional on yt 1 and gt.
The idea is that since policymakers cannot observe todays output, they use their
best forecast of todays output in order to set scal policy. Formally:
gt = E [ytj
t] + "t; (2.11)
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where E [ytj
t] denotes the expected value of yt conditional on the information set

t which, by assumption, contains lagged output and contemporaneous govern-
ment spending (i.e., 
t = fyt 1, gtg). The output equation is still given by (2.9),
and we continue to assume that +  < 1 and jj < 1.
If expectations are rational, E [ytj
t] will be computed using the true model.
Using (2.9), it follows that
E [ytj
t] = yt 1 + gt. (2.12)





1   . (2.13)
The equations to be estimated would then be (2.9) and (2.13). While these equa-
tions are econometrically the same as those to be estimated for Model 2 given
by (2.8) and (2.9)  in this case the coe¢ cient on yt 1 does not capture . To







In sum, the coe¢ cient  (which captures the stance of scal policy) will di¤er
between Models 2 and Model 3. But note that  > 0 if and only if ~ > 0; so our
conclusions regarding the cyclicality of scal policy would be the same with both
models.
Assuming again that this model captures a Keynesian world, what is the opti-
















(1  )2   2
2:
It is easy to check that V ar(yt) is a strictly increasing function of . Hence, the
optimal scal policy will be to set a value of  as low as possible; that is,  !
 1=, which implies that  !  1.
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2.2.4. Model 4: A political economy model
Since there are several political economy explanations of procyclical scal policy
in the literature (Tornell and Lane, 1998, 1999; Talvi and Végh, 2005; Alesina,
Campante, and Tabellini, 2008; and the theory of Chapter 1), it will prove helpful
to reinterpret a slight variation of Model 1 along such lines. While the various
models di¤er in the details, the basic idea is that scal surpluses are badin the
sense that they generate political pressures or rent-seeking activities that tend to
increase spending in good times.
To capture this scenario, let the primary surplus be given by
St  yt   gt; (2.14)
where yt are tax revenues, which are assumed to be proportional to output. In
turn, government spending is given by
gt = g + St + "t, (2.15)
where g is the (exogenously-given) level of government spending in the absence
of any political distortion and  denotes the magnitude of the existing political
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The second equation in this model would remain unchanged (relative to Model 1)
and would still be given by equation (2.2).
The system to be estimated (given by equations (2.2) and (2.16)) would be
the same as in Model 1 but, of course, the interpretation of the coe¢ cient on y in
equation (2.16) would be di¤erent. While we cannot identify, if the estimated
coe¢ cient is positive we would infer that  > 0 since, in practice,  > 0.11 A
positive coe¢ cient would thus be interpreted as evidence of a political distortion
and a positive  as evidence of an expansionary e¤ect of government consumption.12
2.2.5. Model 5: A simple VAR
2.2.5.1. Set-up. In Model 2, we assume that output follows an AR(1) process
and that government consumption can only respond to output with a one-quarter
lag. A natural extension is to allow for both output and government consumption
to follow a vector-autoregressive process including more lags. In Section 2.7 we
11See, for example, Section 1.1 and Talvi and Vegh (2005). The latter nd a correlation of
0.47 between (the cyclical components of) GDP and tax revenues in a sample of 56 countries
(industrial and developing).
12Notice, of course, that the question of the optimal value of  does not apply because, by
construction,  is capturing some pre-existing political distortion.
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where the vector Yt =
0BB@gt
yt
1CCA includes the two variables of interest. The 2x2 matrix
Ck estimates the own- and cross-e¤ects of the kth lag of the variables on their
current observation. The matrix B is diagonal, so that ut is a vector of orthogonal,
i.i.d. shocks to government consumption and output. Finally, the matrix A allows
for the possibility of simultaneous e¤ects between gt and yt.
To x ideas, notice that Model 2 is, in fact, a particular case of (2.17). To see









with a21 =  . Then, the system (2.17) is identical to the one given by (2.8)
and (2.9). Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the assumption that a12 = 0
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(reecting the assumption that yt does not a¤ect gt contemporaneously) is common
in the VAR estimates of the e¤ectiveness of scal policy.
2.2.5.2. Impulse Responses. In order to compare our VAR results with the re-
sults from our OLS, IV, and GMM regressions, we need to be careful in interpreting
the impulse responses.13
The impulse response of g to an output shock after one quarter is dened as
@gt+1=@t. Leading (2.8) and then substituting (2.9) into (2.8), we obtain:





In other words, the impulse response function (one period out, in the VAR(1)
system described above) captures precisely the coe¢ cient of the scal reaction
function. The impulse response in period two (given by @gt+2=@t), however, is a






(yt 1 + gt + t) + "t+1 + t+1 + "t+2.
13While the logic that follows is not new (see, for instance, Blinder (2004)), it is worth spelling





=  + 2. (2.19)
This gives us the full dynamic response of g to the output shock after two periods,
which comprises the following two factors:
(1) The scal policy rule response to additional changes in output in the
following period, due to the autoregressive process that output follows
().
(2) The second-order e¤ect of the scal policy rules response to the scal





Note that there is no direct e¤ect of the output shock on government con-
sumption through the scal policy rule in (2.19), stemming from our assumption
that the system is VAR(1). Fiscal policys direct response to the t shock already
occurred in the rst period. If we wanted to capture this entire e¤ect, we would






=  +  + 2.
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However and to conserve space we will not be plotting the cumulative e¤ect.
The second value of our impulse responses will therefore correspond to (2.19).14
2.2.5.3. Interpretation. As equation (2.1) makes clear, when we perform IV or
GMM estimations and estimate the parameter , we are measuring how govern-
ment consumption reacts contemporaneously to all output movements, whether
anticipated or not. In other words the IV and GMM estimations are able to ad-
dress the issue of causality but not of forecastability, as by denition, we would not
be able to forecast an unanticipated shock to output and hence the scal response.
In contrast, in the VAR estimations, we will be isolating the e¤ects of unantic-
ipated output shocks on government consumption. As discussed in McCallum
(1999), whether this particular exercise is valuable depends on the importance of
unanticipated output shocks for government consumption compared to the e¤ects
of systematic (i.e., forecastable) changes in output. Since this is clearly an open
question at this point, we remain agnostic on this issue and choose to use di¤erent
techniques that allow us to investigate the e¤ects on government consumption of
both forecastable and unforecastable changes in output.
14Needless to say, comparisons between the impulse responses and the other regressions will be
further complicated by the fact that we are running a VARs with more lags than a VAR(1),
for which all the above analysis is given. With a VAR(T) (T>3), the 4-quarter lagged impluse
response of g to  (@gt+4=@t) is a complex formula including 1:::4, 1:::3 and 1:::3. But
the key message remains the same: the impulse response in the rst period out captures ,
whereas all ensuing values capture a complicated combination of structural parameters.
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2.3. The data
In order to explore carefully the question of scal cyclicality, we use a quarterly
data set measuring government spending, the business cycle, and control variables.
A detailed description of the data appears in Appendix C. The data comprises 27
developing countries and 22 high-income countries. Income groupings are primarily
based on the World Banks classication in 2006.15 To ensure the integrity of quar-
terly data, only developing countries who subscribe to the International Monetary
Funds (IMFs) Special Data Dissemination Standard are included. Only those
years for which data was originally collected at quarterly frequency are included,
and countries with less than 8 years (32 quarters) of data have been excluded. The
coverage spans from as early as Q1 of 1960 to as late as Q4 of 2006, but varies from
country to country. Similar results obtain when we use a balanced panel spanning
the quarters 1996Q1 to 2006Q3. The main data source is the IMFs International
Financial Statistics (IFS) database; as needed, we use national sources as well as
the database of Agenor et al (2000) to expand the coverage.
The main variables of interest in exploring the cyclicality of scal policy are real
central government spending, real general government consumption, and real GDP.
15Israel was classied as a high-income country in 2006, but was a developing country for some of
the sample period. Korea graduated into the high-income category in 2001. The Czech Republic
became a high-income country in 2007. We classify these three countries as "developing" since
they met this criterion for much of the sample. The exclusion of these three countries from the
developing country sample or inclusion in the high-income sample does not alter our results.
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As mentioned earlier, an exploration of the cyclicality of scal policy should focus
on indicators that are under direct control of the scal authorities: government
spending and tax rates. Since time series on tax rates are available for only a
small number of countries, we focus on government spending: total expenditures
and government consumption.
There is a trade-o¤ in the choice of the government spending measure. While
the use of a general government measure is more inclusive, as it includes both
central and local governments, the use of central government spending is more
in accordance with the principle of looking at scal policy instruments that are
directly under the control of a single scal agent. On the other hand, total central
government spending includes more spending categories, such as government in-
vestment and transfers, but also interest payments, which makes this measure more
noisy. Much of the literature on the cyclicality of scal policy has used real cen-
tral government spending (e.g. Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh, 2004 and Alesina,
Campante and Tabellini, 2008), while much of the literature on the e¤ectiveness
of scal policy in high-income countries has looked at government consumption or
a combination of government consumption and investment (e.g. Blanchard and
Perotti, 2002; and Perotti, 2004).
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2.3.1. Variables of interest
Indices of real government spending and real government consumption are created
as follows. We obtain real data directly from national sources, whenever available.
For the remaining countries, we deate nominal government spending measures
with the consumer price index (CPI). Nominal government spending variables,
normalized to one in a base quarter, are deated using a CPI index with a similar
base year. Measures of real government spending and consumption deated by
the CPI, the GDP deator, or reported directly from national sources are highly
correlated for countries where more than one of these variables are available.
Real gross domestic product is taken directly from national accounts.
As additional controls and instruments, we include exogenous shocks that may
drive the business cycle. We instrument GDP with international nancial condi-
tions using a measure of global interest rates. Specically, we use the real return
on 6-month Treasury bills.16 As in Jaimovich and Panizza (2007), we also use an
instrument representing real external shocks, namely an index of the real GDP
growth of each countrys trading partners. The construction of this variable is
discussed in Appendix C.
16We use an adaptive-expectations measure of real interest rates. Results are identical with an
ex-post measure of real interest rates.
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All series (except for interest rates) are in logs and, when not reported in
seasonally-adjusted terms, seasonally-adjusted using the X-11 algorithm. Season-
ally adjusting the data using seasonal dummies yields similar results.
2.3.2. Annual data
For estimations at the annual frequency, we use the dataset of Kaminsky, Rein-
hart, and Végh (2004). The data sources are di¤erent (primarily the IMFs World
Economic Outlook). A detailed description of the data can be found in Kaminsky,
Reinhart and Végh (2004). The sample of countries (21 high-income and 81 devel-
oping countries) and years (1961-2003) is larger. We sacriced consistency of data
sources between the quarterly and annual samples for the sake of a larger sample
size.
2.4. Stylized facts
Table 2.1 presents the basic stylized facts of our quarterly sample. The ta-
ble presents regressions of (changes in the logs of) measures of real government
spending against GDP. Results are of panel regressions with country xed e¤ects.
The rst column revisits the familiar stylized fact that government spending is
procyclical in developing countries, regardless of the spending measure studied.
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The results are statistically signicant at the 99 percent condence level. The sec-
ond column presents the results of similar regressions for high-income countries.
While government consumption is mildly procyclical, it is far less procyclical than
in developing countries. We can reject at the 99 percent condence level that the
coe¢ cient is the same for the two income groups. Total government spending, on
the other hand, is acyclical. The estimation is, however, very imprecise, due to the
smaller sample size.17
Table 2.2 shows similar results using annual data. All measures of government
spending are highly procyclical in developing countries. In high-income countries,
total government spending is acyclical, but government consumption and invest-
ment are procyclical. The main di¤erence between high-income countries and
developing countries is in total government spending, where we can establish that
government spending is more procyclical in developing countries (with 99 percent
condence). The di¤erence between the other measures in high-income and devel-
oping countries is not statistically signicant.
In the last row of this table, we provide evidence of the acyclicality of interest
payments in both income categories. This indicates that the cyclicality of debt
17Appendix Table A1 in a longer version of this paper (Ilzetzki and Végh (2008) ) repeats the
OLS regression for government spending using industrial production as a proxy for output, which
increases our sample size. The estimated parameters are virtually unchanged and we can still
reject at the 99 percent condence level that the cyclicality of government spending in the two
income groups is the same.
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service is not driving the cyclicality of total government spending. We conjecture
that, in high-income countries, government spending is less countercyclical than
government consumption largely because of transfers (most likely the automatic
stabilizers that are in place in high-income countries).
In summary, a basic OLS regression reconrms that government consumption
and total spending are procyclical in developing countries. In high income coun-
tries, government consumption is procyclical but government spending is acyclical.
With quarterly data, we can reject the hypothesis that the cyclicality of govern-
ment spending and consumption is the same in the two income groups.
2.5. An Instrumental Variables Approach
We now turn to the question of causality. Is scal policy procyclical in devel-
oping countries, or is reverse causality driving these results? A natural approach
is the use of instrumental variables to disentangle the direction of causality. Such
an approach has been suggested by Rigobon (2004) and Jaimovich and Panizza
(2007). We rst conduct a similar exercise as in Jaimovich and Panizza (2007),
using our quarterly data set.
To formalize our strategy, consider the estimation of equation (2.1) using panel
data:
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gi;t = 1 + yi;t + "1i;t; (2.20)
where yi;t is the output of country i in quarter t, gi;t is real government consump-
tion, and  is the parameter of interest, which reects the cyclicality of government
consumption. Tables 1 and 2 estimate (2.20) using OLS regressions and nd that
government consumption is procyclical in developing countries. However, as (2.7)
indicates, this estimate may be biased.
The typical procedure to correct for this bias when estimating the parameter
 is to nd a set of instrumental variables Z that are correlated with y, but such
that EZj;i;t"1i;t = 0, where Zj;i;t is the tth observation on instrumental variable j for
country i. This is precisely the strategy employed in in Braun (2001), Lane (2003),
Galí and Perotti (2003), and Jaimovich and Panizza (2007). As in the latter, we
include the GDP growth of countriestrading partners as an instrument; as in the
rst three, we also include lagged GDP growth as an instrument. Finally, we add
a third instrument: the real return on 6-month on six-month U.S. Treasury bills.
We use this as a measure of global liquidity conditions that have an e¤ect on the
growth of small open economies.
Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) argue that the rst of these instruments is valid.
Trading partnersgrowth is correlated with output. There is no a priori reason to
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suspect that external trade shocks have an e¤ect on government spending except
through the business cycle channel. Finally, it is unlikely that government spending
of smaller economies has an e¤ect on the growth rates of their trading partners,
which include mainly larger economies. Similarly, the interest rate in the nancial
center may have an impact on the output of smaller countries, but we would not
expect it to have a direct e¤ect on government consumption. However, insofar as
borrowing rates are correlated across countries, it does a¤ect debt service, which is
a component of total government spending. We therefore exclude this instrument
when attempting to estimate the cyclicality of total government spending. Finally,
given that this interest rate may be a¤ected by government expenditure in the
United States (which is included in our high-income sample), we also exclude this
instrument in estimating the cyclicality of government spending in high-income
countries.
In a panel regression with country xed e¤ects, we regress the change in (log)
real government consumption on the change in (log) real GDP, where we instru-
ment for the latter using the variables discussed above. We nd that the contem-
poraneous value and one lag of trading partnersgrowth and one lag of the real
interest rate on U.S. Treasuries have the best predictive power for GDP. In e¤ect,
we are estimating  in equation (2.1), using instrumental variables to correct for
the potential bias suggested by (2.7).
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As in Jaimovitch and Panizza, the estimates in a 2 stage least squares (2SLS)
regression are inaccurate, with large standard errors. We further improve our esti-
mates using GMM regressions. The 2SLS estimator is a special case of the GMM
estimator, with the limitation that the variance-covariance matrix is restricted
to be diagonal. Since heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are both distinct
possibilities in a dynamic panel of the sort used here, the 2SLS estimator is as-
ymptotically less e¢ cient than a more generalized GMM estimator. In our GMM
estimations, we use a Newey-West (1987) estimate of the covariance matrix, which
addresses both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
The results are summarized in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. The OLS regressions, shown
in the rst row of each table, repeat the second and rst rows of Table 2.1, respec-
tively. Real government consumption is procyclical in both income groups, but far
more so in developing countries. Total government expenditure is procyclical in
developing countries, and appears to be countercyclical in high-income countries
(although we cannot reject the hypothesis that government spending is acyclical
there).
The next two rows report the results of the 2SLS and GMM regressions. Stan-
dard errors are in parenthesis. Table 2.3 summarizes the results for government
consumption. In developing countries, the IV regressions conrm that government
consumption is procyclical, with point estimates that are very similar to those
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obtained in the OLS regression. For high-income countries, the IV regressions
rea¢ rm the notion that government consumption is pretty much acyclical. The
results for high-income countries imply that the 95 percent condence interval is
[0.15, -0.37], indicating that with a high degree of condence, we can assert that
government consumption is either countercyclical or at most mildly procyclical.
In the GMM regression, we can moreover reject at the 95 percent condence level
that government consumption in developing countries is no more procyclical than
in high-income countries. In summary, the IV regressions rea¢ rm the conventional
wisdom that government consumption is procyclical in developing countries, but
acyclical in high-income countries.
Turning to total government spending, Table 2.4 summarizes the results. Un-
fortunately, the results for government spending in developing countries are rather
inconclusive. The point estimates are in fact negative, indicating countercyclical
government expenditures. However, the standard errors are very large, so that we
cannot reject the null that government spending in developing countries is pro-
cyclical, countercyclical or acyclical. This results is similar to the one found by
Jaimovich and Panizza (2007): they too obtain negative point estimates for the
cyclicality of government spending in developing countries, but also have large
standard errors, so that inferences on the cyclicality of scal policy are hard to
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draw.18 On the other hand, the instrumental variables regressions do support the
notion that total government spending is countercyclical in high-income countries.
In fact, the point estimates in the IV regressions show government expenditure
decreasing more aggressively due to an increase in output than the OLS regres-
sions estimated. (Only the GMM estimate is statistically signicant, though.) In
summary, the IV regressions rea¢ rm that government spending is countercyclical
in high-income countries but gives inconclusive results for developing countries.
The lower panel in both tables gives the results of the rst stage of the re-
gressions. The coe¢ cient estimates are highly statistically signicant have the
expected signs: trading partnersgrowth leads to higher GDP growth, high inter-
est rates in the U.S. lead to lower growth, and GDP is positively autocorrelated.
The coe¢ cients are also jointly highly signicant. However, in all reported re-
gressions the F-statistics in the rst stage are slightly lower than the threshold
required to reject the hypothesis of weak instruments, based on the test proposed
by Stock and Yogo (2002). Using the Sargan test, we can reject the hypothesis
that system is overidentied in all the GMM regressions and in the 2SLS regression
for government spending in high-income countries.
18For the sake of comparison, in a working paper version (Ilzetzki and Végh, 2008) of this
chapter we recreate Jaimovich and Panizzas (2007) results using annual data (see Table A2). As
in Jaimovich and Panizza (2007), the standard errors are very large making inference from their
results very di¢ cult.
90
2.6. Simultaneous equations OLS
The models estimated in the previous two sections assumed that government
consumption responds to output within the same period. As we suggested, this
approach makes sense with either annual data or with quarterly data to the extent
that government spending can react to business cycle conditions within a quarter
(if, for example, there is some form of automatic stabilization).
In this section, we assume that government consumption can only respond to
business-cycle conditions with a one-quarter lag. This is similar to the identifying
assumption in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), which we use in the VAR estimations
of the following section. We estimate equations (2.8) and (2.9), using OLS with
xed e¤ects. As indicated in section 2.2OLS is not a biased estimator in this case.
The results are summarized in Table 2.5. Government consumption shows a
highly statistically signicant procyclical reaction (with a one-quarter lag) to out-
put in both developing countries and high-income countries. There is also evidence
that, in developing countries, government consumption has an expansionary e¤ect
on output.
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2.7. A VAR approach
We now conduct panel vector autoregressions in an attempt to obtain further
evidence on the dynamic reaction of scal policy to the business cycle. In the





where Yi;t is a vector of variables, reported for country i at quarter t. The vector Y
includes the cyclical components of real government consumption and real GDP, as
well as additional variables. Cyclical components are measured as deviations from
the linear-quadratic trend. We obtain similar results when using di¤erences in logs
as in the previous estimations. We run bivariate regressions, in which the vector Y
includes only the two endogenous variables of main interest. This specication is
helpful since in some cases the two main variables are available for longer horizons
than the other variables. This is also closer to the simple specication in Blanchard
and Perotti (2002). In separate regressions and for comparison purposes we
also control for the real return on 6-month U.S. Treasuries and the weighted growth
of each countrys trading partners.
The matrix Ck measures the response of the variables in Y to a k-quarter
lagged change in the models variables. For example, the appropriate element of
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the matrix Ck will be an estimate of the lagged scal policy response (in terms
of government consumption) to changes in GDP. The term "i;t = A 1Bui;t is a
vector of error terms reecting one-period forecast errors of Y . As is common, we
decompose this error term into a vector of structural shocks ui;t. The matrix B is
assumed to be diagonal, so that each structural shock has a direct e¤ect on only
one variable in Y . However, the matrix A reects contemporaneous e¤ects of the
variables on one another.
We estimate (2.21) in the two specications described (bivariateand full,
the latter with additional controls). In each case, the number of included lags
(ranging from 1 to 8 quarters) was determined based on the Schwartz information
criterion. The choice of lags does not a¤ect the results. We also included country
xed e¤ects.19
2.7.1. Granger causality
We begin our time series analysis by conducting a Granger causality test of the two
variables of interest. Table 2.6 reports these results. The top panel presents results
19As Nickell (1981) has suggested, dynamic models with xed e¤ects may provide biased esti-
mates. While this bias cannot be dismissed entirely for dynamic panels with short time series,
Judson and Owen (1999) estimate that a VAR based on OLS with cross-sectional dummy vari-
ables provides less biased estimates than Arellano-Bond (1991) type estimators, in unbalanced
panels with at least 30 longitudinal observations. This condition is met for all countries in our
sample.
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for developing countries and the bottom for high-income countries. We report the
results of Wald tests for the exclusion of lags of real GDP from the regression
where real government consumption is the dependent variable and conversely for
the exclusion of lags of real government consumption from the real GDP regression.
A robust result emerging from the test is that we can reject at the 99 percent
condence level for both income groups the null that the business cycle does not
Granger-cause government consumption. Meanwhile, the null that government
consumption does not Granger cause GDP is rejected only in the full specication
for both high income countries and developing countries. This provides evidence
that the co-movement of these two variables is likely due to a policy response,
rather than a reverse e¤ect of government consumption on output.
2.7.2. Impulse responses
The system described by (2.21) is under-identied without further assumptions
about the matrix A. We make the following identifying assumptions:
(1) Government consumption requires at least one quarter to respond to GDP
(and other variables). This assumption, whose logic is founded on the fact
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that scal policy has inherent implementation lags, follows Blanchard and
Perotti (2002).20
(2) As before, we assume that the real interest rate on 6-month U.S. Treasuries
and the weighted growth of countriestrading partners cannot be a¤ected
by other variables (or each other). We exclude the U.S. from the high-
income country sample to make the exogeneity of these variables more
plausible in this income group.
The estimated impulse responses for developing countries are shown in Figures
2.1-2.2. Dotted lines reect two-standard-deviation bands. Figures 2.1 and 2.2
present the responses of GDP and government consumption, respectively, to a 10
percent impulse to the two variables. In Figure 2.1, a 10 percent positive shock
to government consumption leads to a statistically signicant e¤ect on output of
about 0.96 percent on impact and a peak e¤ect in quarter 3 of 1.1 percent. Given
an average share of government consumption in GDP in our sample of developing
countries of 17.4 percent, these gures translate into multipliers of 0.55 on impact
and 0.63 at the peak. On the other hand, Figure 2.2 shows that a 10 percent shock
20Notice that this identifying assumption is not necessarily inconsistent with the GMM results
of Table 2.5 since in that case the contemporaneous impact of output on government spending
captures both anticipated and unanticipated changes in output whereas in the VAR case the
contemporaneous e¤ect refers only to unanticipated changes. In other words, it seems plausible
to argue that while anticipated changes in output can a¤ect government spending contempora-
neously (through scal rules), unanticipated changes cannot (due to implementation lags).
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to GDP leads to an increase of around 3 percent in government consumption after
two quarters. We thus see evidence of both procyclical government consumption
and an expansionary e¤ect of scal policy. Taken together, these e¤ects imply that
procyclical scal policy tends to reinforce the underlying business cycle.21
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 repeat the exercise for high-income countries. Figure 2.3
shows that a 10 percent shock to government consumption leads to a signicant
output e¤ect on impact of 0.72 percent and to a peak e¤ect in quarter 9 of 1.7
percent. Given an average ratio of government consumption to GDP in our sam-
ple of high income countries of 18.6 percent, these gures translate into multipliers
of 0.39 on impact and 0.91 at the peak. At the same time a 10 percent shock to
GDP does not appear to have a statistically signicant e¤ect on government con-
sumption in the rst four quarters following the shock. In the long term, however,
government consumption does increase by close to 5 percent. This medium-term
procyclicality of government consumption has been observed elsewhere (see Ravn
21Our identifying assumption relies on the fact that government consumption cannot respond
contemporaneously to shocks. The same identifying assumption is not valid for total government
spending, since this variable also includes automatic stabilizers, which may respond to business
cycle shocks within the same quarter. In spite of that, we show in Ilzetzki and Végh (2008) that
the result regarding the procyclicality of government consumption in developing countries carries
over to total government spending. This result holds regardless of whether government spending
or GDP is ordered rst. The working paper version also includes the impulse responses for the
full model (i.e., adding trading partnersgrowth and real interest rates on 6-month Treasuries)
and shows that the same results carry over.
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and Simonelli, 2007, gure 1-A for example).22 Thus government consumption
shows a procyclical response with long delays.
Figures 2.5-2.8 repeat the exercise of Figures 2.1-2.4, this time with the full
specication. The results are robust to the inclusion of the additional controls.
Finally, Figures 2.9-2.12 present the results of bivariate VAR regressions with
total government spending instead of government consumption. An interesting
contrast emerges: regardless of the ordering of the variables, total government
spending appears to respond countercyclically in high-income countries, but pro-
cyclically in low income countries. This is consistent with the idea that, in high-
income countries, the countercyclicality of transfer renders government spending
(as opposed to government consumption) countercyclical.
2.8. Conclusions
This chapter has used a novel quarterly data set comprising 49 countries and
spanning the period 1960-2006 to analyze whether the positive correlation between
(the cyclical components of) government consumption and output commonly iden-
tied in the literature does indeed capture procyclical scal policy (i.e., a causal
e¤ect of output on government spending) or instead reects reverse causality (i.e.,
22Figure 1-A in Ravn and Simonelli (2007) in fact shows the impulse response of government
consumption to a TFP shock, while here the shock is to GDP. Still, the results are qualitatively
similar.
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a causal e¤ect of government consumption on output). We have used various
econometric methods to address this issue: instrumental variables, GMM, OLS es-
timation of simultaneous equations, Granger causality tests, and impulse responses
from an estimated VAR.
We nd overwhelming support for the existence, in developing countries, of
a causal positive relation from output to government consumption. Our analysis
thus leaves no doubt that scal policy is indeed procyclical in developing countries.
Some commentators on the macroeconomic policies of developing countries have
argued that in the past decade, many developing countries have nally got their
"scal house in order". Our dataset sheds some light on these assertions. Figure
2.13 shows the cyclicality of government consumption in a number of developing
countries before and after the year 2000. We see that with some minor exceptions
government consumption in developing countries is no less procyclical than it had
been in the past. However, given the great growth spurt in the developing world
in the period 2000-2006, the true test of the capacity of developing countries to
conduct countercyclical scal policies will be found in these countriesresponse to
the current global economic slowdown.
Interestingly enough  and contrary to the typical nding in the literature
we also nd substantial evidence of procyclicality of government consumption,
but not of total government expenditure, in high-income countries. Together with
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the recent debates on scal policy in high-income countries, with some countries
currently showing a desire for large discretionary scal stimuli, and others express-
ing reticence, it is apparent that the question of the cyclical properties of scal
policy in industrialized countries is far from settled. Specically, the role of gov-
ernment transfersconstituting the main di¤erence between government spending
and consumptionappears to be an important avenue for future research.
Finally, by taking into account possible reserve causality, we have also identied
a signicant expansionary e¤ect of government consumption on output in develop-
ing countries (a channel that has been disregarded so far in the literature). This
provides empirical support for the when-it-rains-it-pours hypothesis: procyclical
government consumption in developing countries implies that scal policy exacer-
bates the business cycle. We also nd some support for this channel in high-income
countries.
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High-Income Countries Latin America
Social Transfers -.26 .11
Annual data. Cyclical component estimated using Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Source: IMF WEO, except for interest expenditure from the International Monetary Fund's 
Government Finance Statistics. Correlations are between 1970 and 2003.
 n=81 for developing countries and n=21 for high-income countries, except capital expenditures where 
the number of observations is for high-income countries drops to 20. 
 For interest expenditrures n=20 for high-income countries and n=66 for developing countries,
and the time period of the correlation varies from country to country.
In the case of several developing countries only short time periods are available. The reported cyclicality of
interest expenditure is therefore only indicitive that the cyclicality of government expenditure is not 
driven by interest payments, rather than being a percise meausrement of its cyclicality.
Table 1.1
Components of Government Expenditure






All Periods                                             .37
Excluding Crises .33
Periods with Ouptut 
Above Trend
.25
Periods with Ouptut 
Below Trend
.29
Annual data. Cyclical component estimated using Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Source: IMF WEO. Correlations are between 1970 and 2003.
Crisis periods are defined as periods when the cyclical component of GDP is 
two or more standard deviations below trend. 
n=81
Table 1.2
Correlation between Government Expenditure and GDP










.26   (.052) .49   (.029)
n 20 82
Source: Fractionalization data from Alesina et al (2003). 
Fiscal data from IMF WEO. Correlations are between 1970 and 2003.
Cyclical components estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
Table 1.3
Average Ethnic Fractionalization





Dependent Variable: Correlation btw. Government Expenditure and Output
1 2 3
GDP per Capita 
(in thousands)
-0.15 ***                                
(0.02)





0.38 ***                             
(0.13)





-0.07 *                               
(0.04)
-0.07 *                               
(0.04)
n 93 92 84
Adj. R-squared .36 .13 .39
Standard errors in parenthesis, *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
HP-filtered cyclical components of total real central government expenditures and real GDP 
from 1970 to 2003, using IMF WEO data. Correlation is between the cyclical components. 
PPP GDP per capita in US$ in 1970 is from the Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002) database.
The index of ethnic fractionalization is taken from Alesina  et al (2003).
The government stability index is from the International Country Risk Guide (2004).






Value                  
(U.S./Argentina)
Source
σ .0144 / .079
Cooley and Precott (1995), adapted to annual data / Author's 
estimate from IMF WEO data
ρ 0.81 / 0.56
Cooley and Precott (1995), adapted to annual data / Author's 
estimate from IMF WEO data
γ 2
ε 1.7 Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1998)
r 2.4% /  6.4%
 Average annual real yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury Bonds 
(source: IMF) augmented by 400 basis points which was a 
typical bond spread for Latin American Economies in the 
1990s (Table 3 in Eichengreen and Mody (1998) ) 
β 0.976 / .934
Set to match the average debt-to-GDP ratios between 1970 
and 2003 of 43% in the U.S. (source: Congressional Budget 
Office) / 19% in Argentina (source: World Bank Debt Tables 
and IFS). 
g/GDP 11%  /  4.5%
Average central government consumption as a percent of 
GDP over the period in the U.S./Argentina
p 0.9  / 0.8
Average probability that incumbent's party retains office in a 































































GDP per Capita (PPP US$ in 1970)
HP-filtered cyclical components of total real central government expenditures and real GDP from 1970 to 2003, using 



















































GDP per Capita (PPP US$ in 1970)
HP-filtered cyclical components of total real central government revenues and real GDP from 1970 to 2003, using 





















































GDP per Capita (PPP US$ in 1970)
HP-filtered cyclical components of  total real central government surplus and real GDP from 1970 to 2003, using 





























   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Ethnic Fractionalization
HP-filtered cyclical components of total real central government expenditures and real GDP from 1970 to 
2003, using IMF WEO data. The index of ethnic fractionalization is taken from Alesina  et al (2003).
 
 












Figure 1.6: Response of Government Transfers (T) to Wage Shocks
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Figure 1.7: Decision Rule for Government Transfers (T) 
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Argentina Calibrated Model (Overlapps with U.S. Borrowing Constraints)





























Figure 1.10: Government Deficit and Political Cohesion
U.S. Calibrated Model Argentina Calibrated Model




















































Figure 1.11: Government Expenditures and Political Cohesion



























p = 0.8 p = 0.7 p = 0.9






Developing Countries High-Income Countries
Government 
Spending
0.51 ***                                
(0.13)




0.48 ***                                
(0.06)
0.11 ***                         
(0.03)
n (Spend.) 1286 852
n (Consum.) 1598 1946
Standard errors in parenthesis, *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Table 2.1: Stylized Facts
Dependent Variable: Change in Log Real Government Spending Variable





Developing Countries High-Income Countries
Government 
Spending
0.93 ***                            
(0.05)




0.31 ***                                    
(0.14)





1.31 ***                                    
(0.14)




-0.07                                    
(0.28)
-0.09                            
(0.30)
n (Expend.) 3139 754
n (Consum.) 2945 789
n (Interest) 1178 509
Standard errors in parenthesis, *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Annual Data
Table 2.2: Cyclicality of Government Spending--Composition
Dependent Variable: Change in Log Real Government Spending Variable






Developing Countries High-Income Countries
OLS
0.50 ***                                
(0.07)
0.14 ***                         
(0.04)
2SLS
0.47 *                           
(0.27)
-0.07                                 
(0.15)
GMM
0.58 **                              
(0.23)
-0.11                                 
(0.13)
n 1293 1572
Standard errors in parenthesis, *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Developing Countries High-Income Countries
Trading Partners' 
Growth
2.09 ***                                
(0.30)




0.99 ***                         
(0.31)









0.13 ***                             
(0.025)
0.05 **                              
(0.02)
F-Statistic 7.0 10.1
 The critical value for Stock and Yogo weak instruments test is 11.59
Table 2.3: OLS and IV Estimates: Government Consumption
Dependent Variable: Change in Real Government Consumption
Instrumented Variable: Change in Real GDP
Instruments: Weighted GDP Growth of Trading Partners , the Real Interest 
Rate on 6-month U.S. Treasuries, and lagged GDP Growth
First Stage






Developing Countries High-Income Countries
OLS
0.62 ***                                
(0.14)
-0.34                             
(0.56)
2SLS
-0.24                             
(0.52)
-1.81                                 
(1.50)
GMM
-0.41                                 
(0.43)
-1.56 **                              
(0.77)
n 1051 701
Standard errors in parenthesis, *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Developing Countries High-Income Countries
Trading Partners' 
Growth
2.05 ***                                
(0.30)




0.84 ***                         
(0.31)







0.15 ***                             
(0.02)
0.17 ***                         
(0.04)
F-Statistic 6.4 10.2
 The critical value for Stock and Yogo weak instruments test is 11.59
Table 2.4: OLS and IV Estimates: Government Spending
Dependent Variable: Change in Real Government Expenditure
Instrumented Variable: Change in Real GDP
Instruments: Weighted GDP Growth of Trading Partners , the Real Interest 
Rate on 6-month U.S. Treasuries, and lagged GDP Growth
First Stage






Developing Countries High-Income Countries
GDP (-1)
0.38 ***                                
(0.03)
0.53 ***                         
(0.02)
n 1608 1947
Developing Countries High-Income Countries
Government 
Consumption
0.05 ***                             
(.01)
0.01                              
(0.01)
GDP(-1)
0.87 ***                             
(0.01)
0.93 ***                          
(0.01)
Standard errors in parenthesis, *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Equation 2: Dependent Variable--(Detrended Log) Real GDP
Independent Variables: (Detrended Logs of) Real Government Consumption 
and Real GDP (1Q lagged)
Table 2.5: OLS Estimates--Simultaneous Equations
Equation 1: Dependent Variable--(Detrended Log) Real Government 
Consumption






Excluded Variable Bivariate Full
6.96 14.00 ***
(0.14) (0.72)
35.1 *** 34.1 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
n 1517 1297
* Null rejected with 90% confidence
** Null rejected with 95% confidence
*** Null rejected with 99% confidence
Excluded Variable Bivariate Full
12.6 20.5 ***
(0.13) (0.00)
61.5 *** 42.8 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
n 1685 1374
* Null rejected with 90% confidence
** Null rejected with 95% confidence







Wald Test for Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity









Bivariate VAR  
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Bivariate Regression with Government Spending 
Response of Real Government Spending to Shocks 
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Figure 2.10 
Developing Countries 
Bivariate Regression with Government Spending 
Response of Real Government Spending to Shocks 























Bivariate Regression with Government Spending 
Response of Real Government Spending to Shocks 
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Figure 2.12 
High-Income Countries 
Bivariate Regression with Government Spending 
Response of Real Government Spending to Shocks 































Figure 2.13: Correlation between Government Consumption and GDP










A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 (Time Consistent Fiscal Policy). Assume wt follows an i.i.d
process. When scal policy is time-consistent ( p = 1), debt is countercyclical.
Proof. The maximization problem facing the time-consistent government is as
follows:
V (b; w) = max
;T;b0
u (T; ) + EV (b0; w0)
subject to
b0 + w"+1 (1  )" = T
2
+ (1 + r) b+ g;
T  0
If the value function V (b; w) is to have the standard properties as in Stokey, Lucas
and Prescott (1989) (pp. 84, theorem 4.11), the period return function û (b0; b; w)
implied by this problem must be continuously di¤erentiable. There is a set on
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fb; wg where potential non-di¤erentiabilities might be present. These are at the
transitions between the redistributive and the scal crisis regimes.
Think then of the function V (b; w) as being a sum of two separate value func-
tions, each for one of the scal regimes, with each non-zero only in the relevant
subset of the state space. The function V (b; w) is continuously di¤erentiable if the
limits of the di¤erentials of these functions are equal at all intersection points. The
envelope theorem can be applied to both value functions, in the relevant region of
the state space. In both cases the envelope theorem implies:
Vb (b; w) =   (1 + r) ; (A.1)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier on the governments budget constraint.
Without loss of generality, let group A be the transfer recipient in the redistributive











This function is continuous at both TA = 0 and TB = 0. The function V (b; w) is
then continuously di¤erentiable over the entire state space. There is no guarantee
that V (b; w) is twice di¤erentiable. This is not a specic feature of this model. It
is in general di¢ cult to establish that the value function is twice di¤erentiable in a
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large class of recursive models. The objective function is strictly concave and the
set dened by the governments budget constraint is compact, so the value function
is (decreasing in and) concave in b. In the analysis that follows, we will casually
use the second derivatives of the value function. In doing so, we follow Sargent
(1979), who argues that even if a concave value function is not di¤erentiable, one
can view such casual di¤erentiation as a the limit of nite di¤erences.
The cyclicality of debt can be obtained by conducting comparative statics on
the following two equations, which follow from the governments rst order condi-
tions:
b0 + w"+1 (1  )"  T
2
+ (1 + r) b+ g (A.2)
and
1  







0; w0) = 0: (A.3)
Consider the redistributive regime. Here  = T ; so that the tax rate is unaf-
fected by small perturbations in w. Di¤erentiating both equations by w gives
@b0
@w























respectively, where A is the marginal utility of consumption for households in the
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These now combine to give:
24 "(1  ")2A +  (1 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  A +1
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< 0, so that in both regimes, debt is countercyclical. 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 (Borrowing Constraints). Assume that shocks are i.i.d and
either p = 1 or  = 1. For a given level of inherited debt bt 1, if borrowing
constraints are binding for some wage realizations and slack for other wage real-
izations, there exists a cuto¤ wage ~w (bt 1) below which borrowing constraints are
binding and above which borrowing constraints are slack.
Proof. First note that the natural debt limit will never be binding in equilibrium.
A binding natural debt limit puts a positive probability on a sequence where the
government imposes a tax rate of  = 1
1+"
in every subsequent period. (1.12) then
gives !1.
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We thus need only consider the ad hoc borrowing constraint b0  b. For a
given level of inherited debt, b, dene ~w (bt 1) as either (1) the wage realization for
which b0 = b is the solution to the governments maximization problem, without
the ad-hoc borrowing constraint; or (2) the wage lowest wage realization for which
b0 < b, if there is no wage rate for which b0 = b is the optimal choice. Proposition
1 shows that b0 is decreasing in w. Thus 8w > ~w (b) it must be the case that
b0 < b. In case (1), 8w < ~w (b) ; Proposition 1 implies that the optimal choice of b0
is b0 > b, so that the borrowing constraint is binding. In case (2), 8w < ~w (b), the
borrowing constraint is binding by the denition of ~w. Thus borrowing constraints
are binding for all wage realizations w < ~w (b) ; but slack for all w > ~w (b). 
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 (No Fiscal Crisis Traps). Let  (1 + r) = 1 and assume that
wt follows an i.i.d process. For any values of p 2 [0; 1] and  2 [0; 1], if an in-
variant distribution exists, it contains states of nature for which the non-negativity
constraint on transfers is non-binding. In other words, starting in any period t,
the economy will eventually return to the redistributive regime almost surely.
Proof. Assume via contradiction that the economy converges to an invariant dis-
tribution for which t > 0 8t > t, in other words the economy is always in a scal
crisis. Given that Tt = 0 8t, and given that the government cannot discriminate
139
between households in its tax policy, it must be the case that 
 (bt; wt) = V (bt; wt)
8t > t. (1.13) and (1.15) then imply that (1.14) holds in this case. Looking at
(1.14), t is a positive variable following a Martingale process. The Martingale
convergence theorem (see, for example, Shiryaev, 1989 pp. 509, Corollary 3) then
states that t converges to a nite value, ~. The assumption that the invariant
distribution contains only scal crisis states implies that ~  min, where min is










Turning now to (1.13):
~ + EVb (b
0; w0) = 0;
this equation is only a function of b0, because wt is i.i.d. Given that EVb (b0; w0)
is decreasing in b0 (see Appendix A.1), it must be the case that the same value of
b0 = ~b is chosen in each period.











This equation implies that ~ (wt) is strictly increasing. Tax revenues are therefore
increasing in wages:
w"+1 (1  )" =

~ ("+ 1)






With tax revenues increasing in wages, and a constant debt stock the budget
constraint (1.6)
w"+1t ~ (wt) (1  ~ (wt))
" = r~b+ g;
must be violated for some value of wt.
Thus, if an invariant distribution existed where the economy remained in a
scal crisis, t would follow a Martingale and would converge to as state ~ < min
that is in the redistributive regime. This contradicts the existence of a scal crisis
trap invariant distribution. 
A.4. Derivation of the Generalized Euler Equation
We begin by rewriting the two value functions, assuming a di¤erentiable policy
function b0 = f (b; w):
V (b; w) = max
;T;b0
u (T; ) +  [pEV (b0; w0) + (1  p)EW (b0; w0)]
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s.t.
b0 + w"+1 (1  )" = T
2
+ (1 + r) b+ g;
T  0;
and
W (b; w) = u (T ;  ) + (1  )u (0;  )
+ [(1  p)EV (f (b; w) ; w0) + pEW (f (b; w) ; w0)] ;
where T ,   and f (b; w) are the solutions to the maximization problem above.
We now di¤erentiate the two functions, without applying the envelope theorem1.
Beginning with V (b; w) ;
Vb (b; w) = uT (T; )
@T
@b
+ u (T; )
@
@b
+ [pEVb (f (b; w) ; w
0) + (1  p)EWb (f (b; w) ; w0)] fb (b; w) :
1We do so although it is easy to see, and we will verify, that the envelope theorem does apply in
the case of V (b; w).
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Using the denition (1.3) and equation (1.4) this reads:








+ [pEVb (f (b; w) ; w
0) + (1  p)EWb (f (b; w) ; w0)] fb (b; w) :
Next, di¤erentiate the governments budget constraint with respect to b:
fb (b; w) + w









+ (1 + r) :
Now note that whenever T  0 is binding, @T
@b







as (1.10) conrms. This last equation can then be written as
fb (b; w) =





  w"+1 (1  )" @
@b

+ (1 + r) : (A.5)
Plugging this back into (A.4) yields:
Vb (b; w) = 
1     "
1   [fb (b; w)  (1 + r)]
+ [pEVb (f (b; w) ; w
0) + (1  p)EWb (f (b; w) ; w0)] fb (b; w) :
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Replacing (1.13) into the second line of this equation, and using (1.12) in the rst
gives:
Vb (b; w) =  [fb (b; w)  (1 + r)]  fb (b; w) =   (1 + r) : (A.6)
It is reassuring that this result is identical to the application of the envelope theo-
rem to V (b; w) ; as the envelope theorem should apply in this case. We now turn
to W (b; w) where the envelope theorem does not apply.
Wb (b; w) = uT (T; )
@T
@b
+ u (T; )
@
@b
+ (1  )u (0; )
@
@b
+ [(1  p)EVb (f (b; w) ; w0) + pEWb (f (b; w) ; w0)] fb (b; w) :
We can use (A.5) to obtain
Wb (b; w) =  [fb (b; w)  (1 + r)]  + (1  )u (0; )
@
@b
+ [(1  p)EVb (f (b; w) ; w0) + pEWb (f (b; w) ; w0)] fb (b; w) :
Now note that when T > 0; @
@b
= 0, so that the second term is equal to zero. On
the other hand, when T = 0, u (0; ) =  w"+1 (1  )"  while (A.5) reads:
fb (b; w) =  
1     "
1   w
"+1 (1  )" @
@b
+ (1 + r) ;
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giving:
Wb (b; w) =  [(1  p)EVb (f (b; w) ; w0) + pEWb (f (b; w) ; w0)] fb (b; w)
+

[fb (b; w)  (1 + r)]  for T = 0
 [fb (b; w)  (1 + r)]  for T > 0
:
Analyzing the rst line of this equation gives:







EVb (f (b; w) ; w











fb (b; w) ;
using (A.6) and (1.13) in the last step. This gives









fb (b; w) (A.7)
+

[fb (b; w)  (1 + r)]  for T = 0
 [fb (b; w)  (1 + r)]  for T > 0
:
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We now use (A.6) and this last equation in (1.13) to obtain:
 =  (1 + r)
Z
w0jT 0=0






2664 (1  p)  (1 + r)E [00fb (b0; w0)] 

R
w0jT 0>0 fb (b
0; w0) 0dw0 +
R




 p fp (1 + r)E [00fb (b0; w0)]  E [0fb (b0; w0)]g ;
which gives the GEE.
APPENDIX B
Computational Algorithm
I solve a nite horizon variant of the model using backward induction. Let t
be the foresight horizon of the modelthe number of periods from time t = 0 the
end of history. I simulate the model over tsim periods, where tsim < t. The model
is solved computationally as follows.
(1) Create a grid on w and b.
(2) History ends at time t. All outstanding debt bt 1 must be repaid: bt = 0.
The governments time t maximization problem is:
V
t (bt 1; wt) = max
 t;Tt
u (Tt;  t) :
s.t.




giving the solutions  t (bt 1; wt) and T

t (bt 1; wt). This problem is solved









t ) + (1  )u (0; ) :
(3) Iterate back from t 1 to zero. For each t 2 [0; t  1] the incumbent takes
the resulting value functions from the pervious step, V t+1 (bt; wt+1) and
W t+1 (bt; wt+1) ; as given. The incumbent solves
V t (bt 1; wt) = max
 t;Tt;bt+1
8>><>>:
u (Tt;  t)
+ [pEV t+1 (bt; wt+1) + (1  p)EW t+1 (bt; wt+1)]
9>>=>>;
s.t.




giving  t (bt 1; wt), T

t (bt 1; wt) and b

t (bt 1; wt) : The oppositions value
function is given by:




t ) + (1  )u (0;  t )
+ [(1  p)EV (bt ; wt+1) + pEW (bt ; wt+1)] :
(4) Repeat step 3 until t = 0, or until V t = V t+1 and W t = W t+1, in which
case the value functions have converged.
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I simulate the model with 1000 grid points for b, between [ 2; bmax], where
bmax is the highest level that can be repaid almost surely or the ad hoc debt limit,
whichever is smaller. The lower bound on debt (upper bound on assets) is never
binding. Five grid points are used for z, giving ve grid points for w = ez. The
grid points are chosen using the method of Hussey and Tauchen (1991), whose
method we also use to convert the AR(1) process into a discrete Markov chain.
The reported simulations have t = 10; 000 and tsim = 1000. The simulations
results remain unchanged when t = 1; 000; 000. The rst 900 simulated periods are
discarded, to minimize the e¤ects of initial conditions, and moments are calculated
using the remaining 100 periods.
For many parametrizations, the iteration did not converge to stationary value
functions. However, the value functions did converge in a neighborhood around
the models stationary distribution. In other words, the lack of convergence had
little bearing on the long-run dynamics of the model.
APPENDIX C
Data Appendix
The annual sample uses the dataset of Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004).
A detailed description of the data is therein.
The countries are included in the quarterly sample and the length of the time
series for each country are provided in Table C.1.
Following is a description of series and data sources:
Real GDP
For high-income countries, OECD developing countries, and Brazil, South
Africa and Russia, real GDP was taken from OECD series CMPGDP VIXOBSA.
This a seasonally adjusted index of real GDP, reported at quarterly frequency by
national sources, in real local currency units. Real, seasonally adjusted GDP for
Ecuador was obtained from the Central Bank of Ecuador. Industrial production
was used as a proxy for real GDP in Uganda, and was obtained from the Bank
of Uganda. For Chile and India, industrial production (see below) was used as a
proxy for real GDP to expand the sample size. None of the papers results are
altered if real GDP from the IFS is used instead. For other countries, IFS series
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99B.PZF was used. Non-seasonally adjusted series were de-seasonalized using the
X-11 algorithm.
Industrial Production
IFS series 66 was the main data source. The series was normalized to 1 for
1Q2000. Real GDP (see above) was used. Data for South Africa was obtained





For high-income countries and OECD developing countries, and Brazil, In-
dia, South Africa and Russia, real government consumption was taken from the
OECD series for Government Final Consumption Expenditure, using a real index.
Real government consumption for Argentina was taken from MECON, and for
Chile, Ecuador, Israel and Venezuela from their respective central banks. Data for
Ecuador and Israel was seasonally-adjusted by the central banks. Civilian govern-
ment consumption was used for Israel. Venezuelas data on public consumption
di¤ers from other countries in that it includes government investment. We never-
theless leave Venezuelas data as reported. Excluding Venezuela from the sample
does not impact any of the papers results. Nominal government consumption for
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Uganda was obtained from the Central Bank of Uganda. For other countries, IFS
series 91F..ZF (nominal government consumption) was used. All nominal series
were deated using CPI. Deating the series by the GDP deator does not a¤ect
the papers results. Non-seasonally adjusted series were de-seasonalized using the
X-11 algorithm.
Real Government Spending
IFS series 82 (government expenditure) was used. In the case of Chile, a
series of non-interest spending that was available from IFS was used. For Israel,
Malaysia, and Turkey data was obtained from their respective central banks. Data
for Denmark and France was obtained from Eurostat. Series were expanded using
the database of Agenor, McDermott, and Prasad. The series was normalized to 1
for 1Q2000 and then deated using the CPI series, also normalized to 1 for 1Q2000.
Real Return on 6-month U.S. Treasury Bills
IFS series 11160C..ZF. The real Treasury yield was created by deating the
returns on U.S. Treasuries by the CPI ination rate of the previous 6-month period,
using the above stated CPI series for the United States. This is a measure of
expected real return based on adaptive expectations. Using an ex-post measure of
the real return does not impact any of the papers results.
Weighted GDP growth of Trading Partners
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Following Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) we create an index of the GDP growth
of each countrys trading partners as the growth in real GDP (see above) of each
of the countrys trading partners. Trade-partner growth was weighted by the
share of the countrys total exports to each of its trading partners (taken from the
IMFs DOTS database). Finally, each countrys weighted-trade-partner growth
was deated by the countrys average ratio of exports to GDP over the entire
period. This last statistic was created using annual data, with exports (total, to
rest of the world) taken from the DOTS database, and nominal GDP in USD taken
from the IMFs World Economic Outlook database.
Terms of Trade





Start Date End Date
High-Income 
Countries
Start Date End Date
Argentina 93Q1 06Q4 Australia 60Q1 06Q4
Brazil 91Q1 06Q4 Austria 89Q1 06Q4
Chile 96Q1 06Q2 Belgium 95Q1 06Q4
Colombia 94Q1 06Q3 Canada 61Q1 06Q4
Czech Republic 96Q1 06Q4 Denmark 90Q1 06Q4
Estonia 93Q1 06Q3 Ecuador 90Q1 06Q4
India 90Q1 06Q3 Finland 90Q1 06Q4
Indonesia 93Q1 06Q3 France 78Q1 06Q4
Ireland 97Q1 06Q4 Germany 91Q1 06Q4
Israel 95Q1 06Q4 Iceland 97Q1 06Q4
Korea 70Q1 06Q4 Ireland 97Q1 06Q4
Latvia 90Q1 06Q3 Italy 81Q1 06Q4
Lithuania 95Q1 06Q3 Japan 94Q1 06Q4
Malaysia 92Q1 06Q3 Luxembourg 95Q1 06Q4
Mexico 84Q1 06Q3 Netherlands 95Q1 06Q4
Peru 91Q1 06Q3 New Zealand 88Q1 06Q4
Philippines 97Q1 06Q3 Norway 78Q1 06Q4
Poland 95Q1 06Q4 Portugal 95Q1 06Q4
Romania 98Q1 06Q3 Spain 95Q1 06Q4
Russia 95Q1 06Q4 Sweden 93Q1 06Q4
Slovak Republic 95Q1 06Q4 Switzerland 80Q1 06Q4
Slovenia 95Q1 06Q3 United Kingdom 60Q1 06Q4





Table C.1: Length of Time Series by Country
For Real GDP and Government Consumption Series
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